Wednesday, May 6, 2009

Othello; Or, The World According to Iago


Othello is Shakespeare’s hardest, cruelest tragedy. It is hard to describe and hard to understand, and almost as hard and cruel as Iago, an extraordinarily hard, mean, cruel man.

Alone of Shakespeare’s plays, it has a charismatic anti-hero, Iago, who takes up at least as much of our
pained and perplexed attention as the hero. Why? Why does this play need an antihero who looms so large, and whose motives are so perplexing? What if anything does Othello do to earn the fate that Iago causes him to bring down on himself? Why might one man want to “ensnare” another man, soul and body?—Othello’s question to Iago at the end of the play. Or are the agonies inflicted on Othello and Desdemona entirely gratuitous?

THE PLAY
Othello is a Moor, which probably means that he comes from Morocco. He
has risen to the rank of general by merit alone. Iago, one of his officers,
is angry because a man he despises, Michael Cassio, has gotten
the promotion that he, Iago, expected and thinks he deserves. Iago
knows that Othello has just eloped with Desdemona, only daughter of
a Venetian nobleman, Brabantio. With the help of his friend Roderigo,
a would-be suitor, Iago tries to make trouble for Othello by making
sure her father finds out about her elopement. This first attack comes
to nothing when Othello gives his simple and eloquent account of their
courtship before the Duke and the Senate. Then, news arrives that a
Turkish fleet is threatening Venetian interests on Cyprus.
The gale that carries Othello to Cyprus disperses the Turkish fleet.
Iago now has time to put together a more sophisticated plan of attack.
He induces Cassio to start drinking, knowing that Cassio becomes
quarrelsome when drunk. And so it proves, with a little help from
Roderigo. Blows lead to more blows and soon the town is in an uproar.
Othello, furious, demotes Cassio. In despair, Cassio consults with Iago
who advises him to seek help from Desdemona. When Othello sees
them talking, Iago delicately insinuates that Cassio and Desdemona
are having an affair, an idea which instantly takes possession of
Othello’s mind. Desdemona pleads Cassio’s case, and Othello’s jealousy
colors his interpretation of her motives. Whenever she mentions
Cassio’s name, it is as if she were twisting Iago’s knife. When Othello
complains of a headache, Desdemona offers to bind his head with her
handkerchief. But this is no ordinary headache—Othello imagines he’s
growing a cuckold’s horns—and the handkerchief is brushed aside. It
falls to the ground, unnoticed, where Desdemona’s handmaid,
Emilia—Iago’s wife—finds it. Iago has been pestering her to steal it,
and when she tells him about finding it, he snatches it out of her
hands and leaves it where Cassio will find it. Cassio, in turn, gives it
to his trollopy girl friend, Bianca—but not as a gift: he tells her he
found it in his room, and asks her to take out the needlework, because
he likes it and would have it copied before the unknown owner starts
looking for it and demanding its return. A likely story! So thinks
Bianca and she says so, scornfully. But, thinking she has no choice,
she complies.

Meanwhile, Iago tells Othello that he has seen Cassio wiping his beard
with this particular handkerchief— “spotted with strawberries”—and
that, as Othello sees it, clinches Iago’s case. Iago has Othello where he
wants him; he can tell him anything and Othello will believe it. Iago
subtly tantalizes him with sentence fragments, lifted from Cassio’s
conversation, supposedly, and Othello’s imagination does the rest:

Oth. What hath he said?
Iago. Faith, that he did—I know not what he did—
Oth. What? What?
Iago. Lie—
Oth. With her?
Iago. With her? On her; what you will.
Oth. Lie with her? lie on her? We say lie on her when they
belie her. Lie with her! Zounds, that’s fulsome!
Handkerchief—confessions—handkerchief! To confess, and be
hang’d for his labour—first to be hanged, and then to confess.
I tremble at it. Nature would not invest itself in such a shadowing
passion without some instruction. It is not words that
shakes me thus. Pish! Noses, ears, and lips. Is’t possible?
Confess? Handkerchief? O devil! Falls in a trance. IV.1.4

Othello’s mind, as well as his syntax, is unhinged—it is his turn to
speak in sentence fragments—and he faints. Just then Cassio comes by
and wonders what’s going on. Iago tells him that this is Othello’s second
fit in two days and asks him to wait out of sight until he recovers
and departs, because he has something important he wants to talk to
him about. When Othello awakes from his swoon, Iago tells him about
the meeting he has just arranged with Cassio and places him where he
will be able to observe their conversation, unobserved, but not hear it.
The scene plays out as Iago intends: he talks to Cassio about Bianca,
who is in love with Cassio, and Othello (who has been primed by Iago)
thinks they are talking about Desdemona. Then Bianca enters with the
handkerchief, furious at Cassio whom she now sees as a two-timing
rat, throws it in his face and departs in a huff with Cassio in pursuit.
Othello recognizes the handkerchief. He and Iago plot the murder of
Cassio and Desdemona. Cassio’s murder is botched, but nothing prevents
the horrific murder of Desdemona. Poor, simple, self-deluded
Othello insists on calling it a sacrifice, and turning the occasion into a
work of high poetic art.

The handkerchief seals Desdemona’s fate—that and the innocent lie
she tells when Othello asks for it; it also seals Iago’s. When Othello, 
to justify the murder of his wife, cites this key piece of evidence, all 
becomes clear to Emilia, and she reveals how Iago had come into its 
possession. Othello is prevented from killing Iago, but nobody prevents 
Iago from killing Emilia and escaping, briefly. 
When he is caught, he refuses to explain himself. Othello, on
the other hand, wants to talk about what he has done but is as mystified
by Iago as we are. He knows that Iago has manipulated him, but
he has no idea how it was done, or why. What he especially fails to
understand is that he, Othello, had not been an entirely passive victim
of Iago’s insinuations; his imagination rose to the occasion, as it were.
Iago had only to drop a few hints and Othello’s imagination did the
rest. Overcome by grief, shame and despair, Othello kills himself.

IAGO
Iago is a man of the world: the rough, tough world of the streets, taverns,
camps, fleet. He comes from the ranks, not the officer class. He
has banged about and held his own as a man among men. He knows
what people are like—knows human nature because he has studied it,
and what he has learned is that men are mostly a wretched lot. He did
not have to read Machiavelli to learn that; Iago’s cynicism is homegrown,
self-taught, not something he has learned out of books. He has
discovered the blood and baseness of our nature the hard way, at first
hand.

Iago is also the first working-class man to walk the stage on terms
of equality with his social betters. (Othello informs us that he has a
royal lineage.) Though Iago is not the social equal of Desdemona or
Othello or Cassio or even Roderigo, he is their intellectual superior and
moral equal, and he knows it. His lines, his language, have the same
weight, in this play, as theirs. In that sense, Iago’s role has the same
sort of weight as Shylock’s in The Merchant of Venice. In both plays,
the beautiful people of upper-crust Venice are confronted with a force
from below that they do not understand.

Like most strictly practical people, Iago has no use for poetry. The
epic poem of Othello’s life is nothing to him but bragging and fantastical
lies. “Honest” Iago, the practical man who knows the difference
between benefits and injuries, has an aptitude for what we might call
anti-romance: not the poetry of things as they might be, but the prose
of things as they are.

Yet like Othello, Iago is also a man of imagination—with this
caveat: his imagination feeds on what it despises, the emotional
hangups and fixations of others. And while he has a diabolical (the
original sense of diabolikós, “slanderous,” may be relevant here)
knowledge of human weakness, appetites and vices, he himself seems
to have no appetites or vices—or at least no ordinary ones. Which is
not to say that he is a neutral observer of human folly: when he is
talking about sex and sexual appetites, his words acquire a peculiar
energy and suggestiveness, a leering prurience. He is a voyeur who
despises the obscene images that delight his soul, but also a satirist
who loves to dwell on the obscenities he observes.

No one understands Iago—including Iago, who can’t understand
himself. I’ve come to think that Shakespeare himself did not under-
 stand the creature he had invented. Why otherwise would Iago keep
trying, and failing, to explain himself in long, meandering soliloquies?
His motives present a problem because there are so many and they all
seem to count equally with him. It is hard to square the single-minded
intensity of Iago’s malice and his attack with the detached tone of
his assorted and contradictory explanations. This is the problem that
drove Coleridge to describe these explanations in a phrase so apt that
it is now permanently lodged in the critical tradition: “the motivehunting
of motiveless malignity.” One thing is fairly certain however:
Iago is not out to get Othello because of his race. If that were the case,
he’d have said so, somewhere. Iago gives many reasons for hating
Othello, and race is not among them. “Moor” is not a racial epithet or
slur, or used as such in this play. It merely defines Othello according
to his place of origin, as a man from Morocco or north Africa.

When it turns out that Desdemona is safely married and out of reach,
Roderigo turns to Iago and asks him what he should do. Go home and
get a good night’s sleep, says Iago, sensibly, and if Roderigo were a
sensible person that would have been the end of it. But Roderigo is not
a sensible person. He has illusions. He is romantic. He thinks
Desdemona is the love of his life and it won’t be worth living without
her. “I will incontinently drown myself,” he says. He means ‘right
away’ but his weakness and lack of restraint is hinted at in his use of
the word ‘incontinently’—which could also mean ‘unchastely.’
Iago’s first response to Roderigo’s romantic silliness is to make a
joke about it (“If thou dost, I shall never love thee after.”) When
Roderigo persists, petulantly, (“It is silliness to live when to live is torment”),
he tries to educate him. Though Roderigo is more or less uneducable,
there is one idea that he can take in. Here is how the conversation
goes:

Iago. O villainous! I have look’d upon the world for four times
seven years, and since I could distinguish betwixt a benefit
and an injury, I never found man that knew how to love himself.
Ere I would say I would drown myself for the love of a
guinea hen, I would change my humanity with a baboon.
Rod. What should I do? I confess it is my shame to be so fond,
but it is not in my virtue to amend it.
Iago. Virtue? a fig! ’tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus.
Our bodies are our gardens, to the which our wills are gardeners;
so that if we will plant nettles or sow lettuce, set hyssop
and weed up thyme, supply it with one gender of herbs or distract
it with many, either to have it sterile with idleness or
manur’d with industry—why, the power and corrigible authority
of this lies in our wills. If the beam of our lives had not one
scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and
baseness of our natures would conduct us to most prepost’rous
conclusions. But we have reason to cool our raging
motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts; whereof I take
this that you call love to be a sect or scion.
Rod. It cannot be.
Iago. It is merely a lust of the blood and permission of the will.
Come, be a man! Drown thyself? drown cats and blind puppies!
I have profess’d me thy friend.... I could never better
stead thee than now. Put money in thy purse.... It cannot be
that Desdemona should long continue her love to the Moor—
put money in thy purse—nor he his to her—It was a violent
commencement in her and thou shalt see an answerable
sequestration—put but money in thy purse. These Moors are
changeable in their wills—fill thy purse with money. I.3. 347

And so on. Finding that Roderigo is one of the many who can’t distinguish
between a benefit and an injury, he says ‘Here, let me give
you some advice. You refuse to believe that your “love”, as you call it,
is a mere lust of the blood, and maybe you’re right; but you can be
sure that that’s all this great affair of Othello’s and Desdemona’s is
about, and I’ll prove it to you. It’s like money in the bank: these two
are like everyone else. Once the novelty of sex with someone of another
race has worn off, they’ll get bored with each other and start looking
around for someone else. That’s your chance. You can bank on it—
and while you’re at it, get some money for this trip because we’re
going to need it.’

We seem at first to be on familiar philosophical ground when Iago
describes reason as a counterweight to the demands of sensuality and
the senses; reason is what prevents the blood and baseness of our
natures from conducting us to preposterous conclusions. This idea is
as old as Plato’s allegory, in the Phaedrus, of the noble charioteer and
his team of passionate horses, and is deeply embedded in Aristotle’s
Ethics. Reason is normative: not only does reason make knowledge
possible, it tells us how we ought to use it. Iago has no use for such
ideas—which being self-educated he has never heard of anyway.
Reason for him is purely instrumental. And most people, as he has
learned in the school of hard knocks, are not governed by reason of
any kind but by their passions, the blood and baseness of their bestial
natures.

The fact that human beings have this bestial connection is not, for
Iago, merely an abstract truth, but a subject on which his imagination
dwells avidly. One of the first things we learn about him, when he is
bawling at Brabantio under cover of darkness, is that he has an
extraordinarily dirty mind. Sex is not only bestial but obscene, the
dirty little appetite that we share with the lower animals and make
jokes about. What sets us apart from the other animals is the fact that
they can’t control their sexual urges, or make jokes about them, while
we can. Most people, he finds, are unwilling to call their sexual
appetite by its right name, ‘lust’, and insist on ennobling it as ‘love’—
even as they are “making the beast with two backs.” That’s the greatest
joke of all, he thinks, and he takes unholy delight in rubbing our
noses in it. Which is what he is doing to Brabantio in the first scene:

Even now, now, very now, an old black ram
Is tupping your white ewe. I.1.89

The bestial images (and there are more) that delight Iago serve, at
first, only to confuse Brabantio. He doesn’t understand what Roderigo
and his friend are trying to tell him, because he does not have a dirty
or lascivious mind.

If Roderigo is to be of any use, Iago must rid him of his illusions about
love and virtue. He is only partly successful. Roderigo is unwilling to
believe that his love for Desdemona is merely “a lust of the blood and
permission of the will” but he is eager to believe that her love for
Othello is exactly that, for it is in his self-interest to do so—if all
Roderigo wants is to possess her. It doesn’t occur to this weakling that
by allowing Iago to define his interest in Desdemona in these terms,
he too is being defined.

Yet weak, self-indulgent and loose-minded as he is, Roderigo puts
up more resistance to Iago’s insinuations than Othello does. He can’t
rid himself of the idea that Desdemona is a virtuous lady—he keeps
reverting to his habitual illusions—and has to be braced up by Iago’s
cynical realism, as we see in the scene that occurs shortly after they
have arrived in Cyprus. Iago, having observed Cassio’s courtly behavior
to Desdemona, tries to convince Roderigo that this is not courtesy
but “lechery... an index and obscure prologue to the history of lust and
foul thoughts.” And Iago, with part of his mind at least, honestly
believes this. He almost never says anything that he knows is completely
false. Though he knows that Cassio and Desdemona are not
having an affair—they haven’t had time, for one thing—he also knows
that given enough time there’s a pretty good chance that they will. And
on this score, probability, he could be right. (It is not so very unusual
for handsome young men to seduce beautiful young women married
to much older husbands. Folklore is on Iago’s side in this.) Roderigo
betrays his own deepest beliefs as Iago dangles the promise of a successful
seduction before his nose. And so the blood and baseness of
Roderigo’s own nature brings him to the preposterous conclusion that
he might become the lover of Desdemona.

The corruption of Othello’s imagination is a different, subtler and
more terrifying affair altogether. More innocent and less sophisticated
by far than Roderigo, Othello is more easily infected by Iago’s cynicism.
Insofar as an intention can be inferred from a result, this would
seem to be the effect that Shakespeare intended to achieve when he
chose for the basis of his play, this tale (from Giraldi Cinthio’s
Hecatommithi, 1565), about a valiant Moor and his villainous ensign:
that is to say, a man from the European outback who, like Othello, had
not yet been affected, or corrupted, by European ways and European
sophistication.

Othello’s nobility is simple, natural, ingrained, like that of the savages
whom Montaigne describes in his essay Of Cannibals. What happens
when such a man meets a modern man, a mean and cynical man
in our modern sense of that word, a man like Iago for whom nobility
is no more than an affectation or an artifice, and virtue is either a joke
or a screen for one’s selfish motives and appetites? He is destroyed, of
course. Shakespeare turned Cinthio’s tale into something new, terrible
and contemporary: a tale about the corrosive effects of European
moderrnity itself when it comes into contact with a pure form of its own
traditional and most deeply cherished ideals, as embodied in Othello
and Desdemona.

OTHELLO
When Iago, early in the play, warns Othello that Desdemona’s father,
Brabantio, has the power to bring down on him the full force of
Venetian law for having the temerity to elope with his daughter, he
gets the following superb reply:

Let him do his spite;
My services which I have done the signiory
Shall out-tongue his complaints. ‘Tis yet to know—
Which, when I know that boasting is an honour,
I shall promulgate—I fetch my life and being
From men of royal siege, and my demerits
May speak unbonneted to as proud a fortune
As this that I have reach’d; for know, Iago,
But that I love the gentle Desdemona
I would not my unhoused free condition
Put into circumscription and confine
For the sea’s worth. I.2.28

Reuben Brower has aptly described Othello’s voice here as “aloof, ceremonious
and romantically grand,” the pace of these lines, slow and
expansive: “Like other heroes, Othello grandly assumes—and demonstrates—
that there are occasions when boasting is fit and honorable.
Altogether, the movement and the matching assurance of diction give
an impression of a temperament well ordered and serene, of a man
who rests—a bit naively—on his dignity.” 

The sentence beginning “For know, Iago....” tells us something
important about the origin of this well ordered, serene and immensely
dignified temperament: it is part of his royal inheritance. He did not
acquire it by knocking about in cities, like Iago. As the story of his life
will shortly make even clearer, Othello is a man from the wide, open
spaces and proud of it. Just how proud can be measured by the
immeasurable value he puts on his love for Desdemona and on the life
he has had to give up in order to marry her. Both are as immeasurable
as “the sea’s worth.” But for Desdemona, he would never have
given up the wild, free way of life that has made him what he is. He
cares nothing for Venice and its laws, and he is certainly not afraid of
anything Venice might do to him. He doesn’t need this city; it needs
him. He wouldn’t be housed here at all if it weren't for Desdemona—
the implication being that if Brabantio manages to make the place too
hot for him, he’ll clear out, go back to his old life in the tented fields
of the outback. (And take Desdemona with him? But of course he hasn’t
thought this through.)

As Othello and Iago are talking, Cassio enters along with some officials
with torches. Iago, thinking (mistakenly as it turns out) that
Brabantio and his friends have come to seize Othello, advises him to
be prudent and “go in.” To which Othello, with the same superb confidence
and dignity, replies,

Not I; I must be found.
My parts, my title, and my perfect soul
Shall manifest me rightly. I.2.32

A perfect soul? The wine he drinks is made of grapes, as Iago will later
say of Desdemona. But we know what Othello means: it is his way of
saying that he has done nothing wrong, has nothing to be ashamed of,
nothing to hide. Still, the phrase rankles slightly. No one has a perfect
soul. No good Christian, of any persuasion, would have said such a
thing, only an erring barbarian who doesn’t know any better. But you
don’t have to be a Christian to feel that Othello is going a little too far—
just ordinarily sceptical and cautious. Anyone who thinks he has a
perfect soul is riding for a fall. What would it do to him, we may wonder,
should he discover—as is not unlikely, in the rough and tumble of
the world—that his “perfect” soul has a tiny crack? As it happens, the
tiny crack is found in Desdemona’s otherwise blameless soul, when
she tells her little lie about the handkerchief, and that discovery opens
a hole in Othello’s soul through which the misogyny of Iago can enter.
The perfection of Othello’s soul is a weakness, not a strength, for
the perfect soul is also a simple soul, and simple souls tend to make
mistakes that more complicated and less perfect souls would not.
Being without guile, a complicated necessity in an imperfect world,
they assume that others are guileless as well. They know, of course,
that they live in an imperfect world, full of imperfect people, but that
knowledge does not lead to wisdom or tolerance. Perfect souls, for
instance, cannot tolerate the smallest blemish in themselves or others,
for there are no grades of perfection; one is either perfect or imperfect.
Since the perfect soul demands the perfect love and the perfect bride,
the merest hint of corruption or imperfection is unbearable. Thus
Othello joins a select group of other Shakespearian perfectionists who
make absolute demands on life and suffer accordingly: Hotspur and
Coriolanus who demand perfect, absolute honor, Brutus who demands
absolute virtue, Hamlet who demands absolute authenticity of himself
and his mother, Lear who demands but cannot give absolute, unconditional
love and Cordelia who demands absolute sincerity.

When it is all over and Othello knows as much of the truth about what
he has done as it is given him to know—which is not much—he tries
to salvage a little dignity and self-respect from the wreckage of his life
before he ends it.

When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice. Then must you speak
Of one that lov’d not wisely, but too well;
Of one not easily jealous, but being wrought,
Perplex’d in the extreme.... V.2.346

Unlucky? Perplexed? Indeed. Othello certainly has some extraordinarily
bad luck and, “being wrought” upon by Iago, becomes extraordinarly
perplexed. Were we to speak of Othello as he would wish, however,
we’d have to leave out the scariest parts of his story. That word
“perplexed” doesn’t begin to convey the scale and demonic intensity of
his delusions, or the alacrity with which he embraces them. He is not
a passive victim of Iago’s machinations. Something monstrous in
Othello’s soul awakes at Iago’s call, and he is not wise enough or experienced
enough to deal with it. He is not stupid, for then the play
becomes meaningless. He’s an innocent, rather, a man from a simpler
world on the frontiers of European civilization, who relies on his
friend, Iago, to educate him about European ways.
Othello may be correct when he describes himself as “not easily
jealous,” but jealousy is not the right word for the thing that overwhelms
his love for Desdemona with such astonishing ease and speed.
Today, I suppose, we’d call it misogyny, a term that would not be
invented, according to the OED, for another 50 years or so; though the
word seems inadequate to describe the attitude that Othello so readily
takes toward Desdemona—his extraordinary willingness to see her as
a creature of disgustingly super- or sub-human sexual appetites when
Iago gives him a nudge in that direction.

An ordinary man would have ignored Iago or laughed him off; the
bestial images that Iago calls up have long been domesticated in
Western art and literature (beginning, perhaps, with the story of Circe
and her tricks in the Odyssey). But Othello is not an ordinary man; nor
does he know anything at all about art or literature or history. He has
no defense against the thoughts and images that, whispered into his
ear by Iago, begin to infest and infect his imagination. That is to say,
he has no defense against his own imagination, which soon takes on
a power and a life of its own quite independently of Iago’s tutelage.
The brothel scene (IV.2) is Othello’s own invention. Imagination, as
Johnson knew, is not always benign. It has the power to create its own
reality.

The corruption of Roderigo, in I.2 and II.1, is a dress rehearsal for the
corruption of Othello, which occurs with astonishing speed. A wink
and a nod, it seems, and the deed is done.

Following his ill-advised interview with Desdemona, Cassio hurriedly
leaves the stage as Othello and Iago enter from the other side.
Cassio knows, in his heart, that he should not be trying to approach
Othello through his wife, and so his sudden departure has a slightly
guilty look which Iago is able to make use of. “Hah? I like not that,”
he mutters.

Oth. What dost thou say?
Iago. Nothing, my lord; or if—I know not what.
Oth. Was not that Cassio parted from my wife?
Iago. Cassio, my lord? No, sure, I cannot think it,
That he would steal away so guilty-like,
Seeing your coming.
Oth. I do believe ’twas he. III.3.40

And so the seed of suspicion, dropped in the right place at the right
time, begins to grow helped along by Desdemona’s attempt to reinstate
Cassio in Othello’s favor, in the course of which she innocently reveals
the fact that Cassio had known about Othello’s courtship from the first.
This comes as a surprise to Iago. Cassio had earlier pretended to know
nothing of Othello’s marriage, and Iago had believed him. Now he
knows he has been deliberately misled by both Cassio and Othello. No
wonder Cassio got the promotion that he, Iago, had wanted and
expected! Cassio was the insider all along and he, Iago, the outsider.
These are real thoughts, as it were, and they are really running
through Iago’s mind as he asks Othello about this little fact which has
just been inadvertantly revealed (a bit of business that Iago, obviously,
could not have planned on.)

Did Michael Cassio, when you woo’d
my lady,/ Know of your love?”
Oth. He did, from first to last. Why dost thou ask?
Iago. But for a satisfaction of my thought,
No further harm.
Oth. Why of thy thought, Iago?
Iago. I did not think he had been acquainted with her.
Oth. O yes, and went between us very oft.
Iago. Indeed!
Oth. Indeed? ay, indeed. Discern’st thou aught in that?
Is he not honest?
Iago. Honest, my lord?
Oth. Honest? ay, honest.
Iago. My lord, for aught I know.
Oth. What dost thou think?
Iago. Think, my lord?
Oth. Think, my lord? By heaven, thou echo’st me,
As if there were some monster in thy thought
Too hideous to be shown. Thou dost mean something.
III.3.108

Iago does mean something but he does not necessarily mean something
monstrous. The question he is mulling over about Cassio’s honesty
could be an innocent one: “And here I thought these liars were my
friends!”  Of course he knows very well that his (in one sense) perfectly
genuine hesitations over Cassio’s ‘honesty’ can and probably
will be understood in a less innocent way. It is an inspired bit of oppor-
 tunism by a genius of improvisation who uses the raw materials of
perfectly authentic thoughts and feelings to construct a sexual fantasy
that only an imagination both powerful and naive could take seriously:
Iago has only to sound as if he means something monstrous
and Othello does the rest.

Unlike Roderigo, Othello has no sense of what is possible or probable
in a place like Venice, or its European outpost on Cyprus, and is as
defenseless against the sophisticated tactics of Iago as one of
Montaigne’s cannibals: “Three of these men, ignorant of the price they will pay some day, in loss of repose and happiness, for gaining knowledge of the corruptions of this side of the ocean; ignorant also of the fact that of this intercourse will come their ruin (which I suppose is already well advanced: poor wretches, to let themselves be tricked by the desire for new things, and to have left the serenity of their own sky to come and see ours!)—three of these men were at Rouen....” 

Othello has met these men in his travels, these cannibals or “Anthropophagi” as he rather pointedly adds, out of a desire
(perhaps) to appear more learned, or more European, than he really is. He is more like
them than he realizes and equally deserving of Montaigne’s prophetic pity.]

Speed is of the essence in Iago’s attack: Othello must not have time
to reflect, ask questions, talk to others, compare notes, and the audience
has to be hurried along at the same rate and for the same reasons;
the web that Iago spins is tenuous, fragile and improbable, and
cannot withstand close inspection. Indeed, the series of deceptions that
are practised on Othello would not deceive any normally intelligent
person—one, that is, who has had some experience of the con men,
card-sharps, shell-game operators, stock-jobbers, etc., that prey on the
innocent or foolish in all complex urban societies. And their frauds are
usually a lot subtler than Iago’s. The essence of his game, as soon as
he has got Othello’s attention, is to make him confuse words, symbols,
and representations with the thing or things referred to, symbolized,
represented. No ordinarily intelligent member of the audience would
accept as conclusive the sort of evidence that Iago offers Othello as
proof of Desdemona’s dishonesty: Cassio’s words and actions in his
sleep as observed and recounted by another; a conversation observed
from afar but not overheard; an easily recognized handkerchief in the
possession of the supposed rival. The flimsiness of all this is not a
fault of the play, however, as many critics (beginning with Thomas
Rymer in the seventeenth century) have supposed, but its point. Only
a very innocent or very stupid man would be taken in by Iago’s
sleight-of-hand, and we know that Othello is not stupid. His is the
radical innocence, as Shakespeare understood it, of the noble savage.
But that is a point that few audiences are likely to appreciate. So if the
tenuousness of Iago’s web is such that a whiff of common sense would
tear it apart, what keeps this play from crashing? The force of Iago’s
mind and imagination and the power of his words.

Take for example the extraordinary conversation I have just quoted,
beginning with Iago’s question, “Did Michael Cassio, when you
woo’d my lady,/Know of your love?” While these questions, answers,
pauses, repetitions and hesitations mimic the spontaneous rhythm of
a conversation, it is a conversation in which only one of the speakers
knows what he is talking about, or where he is going, a duet in which
only one of the singers knows the score, or a dance of which only one
dancer knows the steps. The paired sequence of trochaic questions,
honest ?. . .honest? . . .honest? and think? . . . think? . . .think? each
of which makes up a hexameter line, is breathtaking in its slippery
simplicity and innocence, and terrible with the beauty of a finely
designed, perfectly efficient machine. Iago’s art, in its subtlety and
simplicity, is clearly of a higher order than any machine, and like all
great art it is—in the last analysis if not the first— being performed for
its own sake. The destruction of Othello’s innocence, which entails the
destruction of Desdemona and Cassio as well, is an end in itself—envy
being, oddly enough, a disinterested vice: Iago does not stand to profit
by any of this; whatever happens to Othello as a consequence of his
wife’s murder, Iago will be out of a job. He can “plume up his will”
(1.3.392) on the success of his “double knavery” if he isn’t caught—
or even if he is—and that’s all. But it’s all he cares about.
Iago is an artist and Othello is his masterpiece. Does that make him
the subliminal hero of this cruel tale? It is undeniable, at any rate, that
he is as interesting in his way as Othello and Desdemona are in theirs;
we are torn, it seems to me, between fear and pity for their largely passive
sufferings, and awe at Iago’s wit, intelligence, energy and luck
Hence it is that we may begin to observe the disintegration of
Othello’s perfect soul with something of Iago’s interest and detachment.

Look where he comes! Not poppy nor mandragora,
Nor all the drowsy syrups of the world,
Shall ever medecine thee to that sweet sleep
Which thou ow’dst yesterday. III.3.333

As Othello enters, we observe him, as instructed, and what do we see?
Not a man who has just eaten poison and looks it, as Iago has just
been saying (“the Moor already changes with my poison”) but a man
whom we can only see, momentarily at least, as Iago extravagantly
and rather touchingly imagines him: a man on whom the most exotic
drugs and “drowsy syrups” of the world will be powerless, a man who,
like Macbeth, will never again get a good night’s sleep. And so we are
distracted from the realities of Othello’s plight by the beauty of Iago’s
poetry—just as, a few lines later, we are being similarly distracted by
Othello’s great farewell to arms aria.

O now, for ever
Farewell the tranquil mind! Farewell content!
Farewell the plumed troop and the big wars
That make ambition virtue! O, farewell!
Farewell the neighing steed and the shrill trump,
The spirit-stirring drum, th’ ear-piercing fife,
The royal banner, and all quality,
Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war!
And O ye mortal engines whose rude throats
Th’ immortal Jove’s dread clamours counterfeit,
Farewell! Othello’s occupation’s gone! III.3.357

The aria is the point. It’s not that Othello doesn’t know what war is
really like, or that he romanticizes war as he romanticizes himself,
Desdemona, and their marriage, but that war seems romantic and glorious
because it is now part of a world that he has been shut out of.
His occupation is gone, finished. And why is that? Because he has
become a fallen man, though not in Christian terms, for he still a
pagan at heart: he has fallen from the ideal world of epic and romance,
into—as he now believes—Desdemona’s sleazy world, which is also
the world we are shown in Troilus and Cressida, a world of whores,
pimps, courtesans, seducers, seedy politicians, stupid wars, contemptible
heroes. He thought he was above all that, and now here he
is, right down in the middle of it after all, cuckolded by a whore and a
false friend, Cassio—who, it turns out, was nothing but a go-between
and an adulterer. It is in keeping, then, with his new sense of who and
where he is that he should say, with his very next breath, “Villain, be
sure thou prove my love a whore!” (III.3.359)

If he thinks he can’t get any lower than that, he is wrong. As he and
Iago begin to talk, ostensibly, about how this proof might be obtained,
Iago continues, with mock delicacy and real obscenity, to poison
Othello’s imagination:

Iago. I see, sir, you are eaten up with passion.
I do repent me that I put it to you.
You would be satisfied?
Oth. Would? Nay, and I will.
Iago. And may; but how? how satisfied, my lord?
Would you, the supervisor, grossly gape on?
Behold her topp’d?
Oth. Death and damnation! O!
Iago. It were a tedious difficulty, I think,
To bring them to that prospect; damn them then,
If ever mortal eyes do see them bolster
More than their own. What then? How then?
What shall I say? Where’s satisfaction?
It is impossible you should see this,
Were they as prime as goats, as hot as monkeys,
As salt as wolves in pride, and fools as gross
As ignorance made drunk. III.3.405

The question that transforms Othello from a casual “supervisor” to a
grossly gaping voyeur—in one line—is a daring masterpiece of subliminal
pornography. Iago’s cool confidence is very impressive, as he
delicately insinuates his obscene idea into Othello’s imagination,
walking as close as he can get to the edge that separates what can and
cannot be safely said—and then even closer in the next half-line: “topp’d”
is subtly, perfectly graphic. If he can get away with that, he can
get away with anything; the rest is easy. After a bit of mock cogitation,
the tedious difficulties disappear and Othello is being entertained, so
to speak, by the sexual antics of Iago’s menagerie, goats, monkeys and
wolves, dressed up as Cassio and Desdemona—or vice-versa.
Impossible that Othello should see this? He just has.

All of this could have been said and done in prose. What’s good
enough for the makeover of Roderigo’s mind, however—a person of no
importance and a fool—is not appropriate for a man like Othello.
Roderigo inhabits the sleazy world of things-as-they-are; a creature,
for the most part, of desires and appetites, without many principles,
and with no imagination at all. Othello’s world, on the other hand, is
that of epic and romance which only exists in poetry. As a poet of
extraordinary power himself, and a man who thinks in images and
metaphors, he is vulnerable to the images and metaphors of a man he
trusts: destroyed by the sophisticated poetry of a man who despises
poetry and romance as humbug. (“Mark me,” says Iago to Roderigo,
II.1. 222-4, “with what violence she first lov’d the Moor, but for bragging
and telling her fantastical lies.”)

Othello’s use of epic simile in his oath of fidelity to Iago is an indication
of the direction that this inveterate self-romancer and dramatizer
of self is about to take:

Oth. O, blood, blood, blood!
Iago. Patience, I say; your mind perhaps may change.
Oth. Never, Iago. Like to the Pontic sea,
Whose icy current and compulsive course
Ne’er feels retiring ebb, but keeps due on
To the Propontic and the Hellespont,
Even so my bloody thoughts, with violent pace,
Shall nev’r look back, nev’r ebb to humble love,
Till that a capable and wide revenge
Swallow them up. III.3.460

What begins as an ordinary scream for blood takes a sudden turn back
into the epic world, specifically the world of the Iliad: ancient Troy
overlooked the Hellespont.

This extraordinary scene ends as Iago, having knelt and sworn
eternal fidelity to Othello, and receiving in return the coveted appointment
as his lieutenant, says, “I am your own for ever.” But it is
Othello who now belongs to Iago, to be tormented and tortured as Iago
pleases.

Othello is a simple soul and easily infected by Iago’s misogyny, but not
by his cynicism. Cynicism requires some capacity for rational reflection--
about motives, human nature, the world. Misogyny is endemic
in men who have grown up in societies in which the sexuality of
women is regarded as a force to be rigidly controlled. Cynicism is an
altogether more complicated state of mind; the emotions of misogyny
depend on how the sexuality of women is imagined. A more cynical
Othello would not be surprised or hurt by Iago’s revelations, but he
would also be more sceptical, not only of Iago’s proofs but of his
motives.

“Perhaps no human mind,” says Samuel Johnson’s sage, Imlac, “is
in its right state. There is no man whose imagination does not sometimes
predominate over his reason.... No man will be found in whose
mind airy notions do not sometimes tyrannize....” In this play, that
man is Othello, who not only allows Iago’s airy notions to tyrannize
his mind but even seems to welcome them.

The wilful nature of Othello’s delusion is fully brought out by the
mad scene (IV.2) in which he perversely assumes Desdemona’s guilt,
as a whore, while refusing to tell her why he thinks so. Instead of
directly and openly interrogating her about Cassio, as he does Emilia
at the beginning of this scene, he pretends that he has come to hire
Desdemona’s services in a whore house, of which Emilia is the bawd.
Cassio’s name is never mentioned, nor of course are any of the proofs
that Iago has supplied. (It is only later, behind the scenes as it were,
that Desdemona learns from Emilia that Cassio is the object of her
husband’s suspicions.)

Why doesn’t Othello talk to his wife in the same direct style he uses
when he is talking to Emilia? (Emilia is a servant, to be sure, but that
explains nothing in this situation.) Were he to talk openly and frankly
to Desdemona about his suspicions, there’d be no play; common sense
would prevail, the flimsiness of Iago’s proofs would be quickly
exposed and that would be the end of that. So the question misses the
point: frank, open, direct talk about sex and adultery is just what
Othello will not or can not do. To ask Desdemona direct questions is to
open up a rational dialogue in which information is exchanged and
analyzed, and mistakes acknowledged. It would also mean treating
Desdemona as an ordinary human being instead of the monster he
imagines her to be. What Othello imagines, though, is more real for
him than what he is rationally capable of understanding. Though he
knows that he and Desdemona are not actually in a brothel, her image
as a woman of monstrous sexual appetites has blossomed so extravagantly
that everything he knows or remembers is regarded as a fanciful
illusion.

A moment of calm and comic reflection intervenes just before the
dreadful finale of this horrifying play. Desdemona is doing what she
has been told and getting ready for bed. She has just been singing a
sad song about a false lover who shrugs off his infidelities with the
ambiguous remark, “If I court moe women, you’ll couch with moe
men.” There follows this curious conversation between Desdemona
and Emilia:
Des. O, these men, these men!
Dost thou in conscience think—tell me, Emilia—
That there be women do abuse their husbands
In such gross kind?
Em. There be some such, no question.
Des. Wouldst thou do such a deed for all the world?
Em. Why, would not you?
Des. No, by this heavenly light!
Em. Nor I neither, by this heavenly light; I might do’t as
well i’th’dark.
Des. Wouldst thou do such a deed for all the world?
Em. The world’s a huge thing: it is a great price for a small
vice.
Des. Good troth, I think thou wouldst not.
Em. By my troth, I think I should, and undo’t when I had
done’t. Marry, I would not do such a thing for a joint-ring, nor
for measures of lawn, nor for gowns, petticoats, nor caps, nor
any petty exhibition. But, for all the whole world? ud’s pity,
who would not make her husband a cuckold to make him a
monarch? I should venture purgatory for’t.
Des. Beshrew me, if I would do such a wrong for the whole
world!
Em. Why, the wrong is but a wrong i’th’ world; and having
the world for your labour, ’tis a wrong in your own world, and
you might quickly make it right.
Des. I do not think there is any such woman.
Em. Yes, a dozen, and as many to th’ vantage as would
store the world they played for. IV.3.85

I quote this exchange at length because there is no good way to paraphrase
it without losing the sound, to which Desdemona is deaf, of
Emilia’s plain-spoken wit and common sense. Desdemona can’t take
in anything that practical Emilia is half-humorously saying about the
value of chastity in relation to other goods because she, like her husband
(and Isabella in Measure for Measure and, very likely, most of
the audience), regards chastity as an intrinsic and absolute good.
Emilia is joking, but this is serious joking. It is the sort of joking that
must always have gone on in the servants’ quarters at the expense of
their masters and mistresses. The jokes of servant women, who had
their own husbands to deal with as well as the men of the house, both
masters and servants, would have been especially pointed, and we see
an example of this in something Emilia had said earlier about men in
general:

Tis not a year or two shows us a man:
They are all but stomachs, and we all but food;
They eat us hungerly, and when they are full
They belch us. III.4.106

Only those who could afford to do so thought chastity worth making
a life-or-death fuss about. Emilia is not being cynical, merely realistic.
One may not care for Emilia’s humorous refusal to put chastity at the
top of her list of possible goods, but there is a powerful reason why
she and her point of view cannot be dismissed as a variant of Iago’s
cynicism: were she as cynical as he, she would not be driven by moral
outrage to reveal the truth about how he had got hold of that wretched
handkerchief.

If what Emilia is offering us here is comic relief, it can only be relief
from the oppressive notion that chastity is worth killing or dying for.
But that’s what’s about to happen. It’s as if Shakespeare were giving
the audience a bit of advice: don’t let yourself be confused by the ele142
gant and beautiful poetry with which Othello, in his confusion,
attempts to justify and dignify this murder; just because it sounds
good, doesn’t mean it is good. For Desdemona is about to be turned
into an object for our as well as Othello’s esthetic contemplation, which
raises the question: Should one be so calmly, nobly, lovingly reflective
about a person one is about murder?

It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul;
Let me not name it to you, you chaste stars,
It is the cause. Yet I’ll not shed her blood
Nor scar that whiter skin of hers than snow
And smooth as monumental alabaster.
Yet she must die, else she’ll betray more men.
Put out the light, and then put out the light:
If I quench thee, thou flaming minister,
I can again thy former light restore
Should I repent me. But once put out thy light,
Thou cunning’st pattern of excelling nature,
I know not where is the Promethean heat
That can thy light relume. When I have pluck’d thy rose,
I cannot give it vital growth again,
It needs must wither. I’ll smell thee on the tree.
[Kisses her.]
O balmy breath, that can almost persuade
Justice to break her sword! One more, one more.
Be thus when thou art dead and I will kill thee
And love thee after. One more, and that’s the last.
So sweet was ne’er so fatal. I must weep,
But they are cruel tears. This sorrow’s heavenly,
It strikes where it doth love. She wakes. V.2.22

What does that mean, “it is the cause”? Othello repeats that phrase
three times as if he likes the sound of it or as if he had, after prolonged
reflection, satisfied himself that after all “it” is the reason why he is
going to do whatever it is he intends to do. But Othello, as we know
by now, is not a thinker. He also shrinks from calling things by their
right names. He can’t or won’t give his suspicions a name when he is
face to face with Desdemona in his brothel, perhaps because he doesn’t
know how and is really afraid of her, perhaps because he is afraid
of himself. Here he says he’d rather not name “it” to the chaste stars
(much less the wretched audience), so as not to offend them, perhaps;
more likely because to do so would put him on a level with all the other
low, vulgar fellows who murder their wives or lovers for reasons that
are no different from his.

And what happened to the whore-house that Othello had conjured
up in IV.2? The cunning whore of Venice that he had put in it? If
Othello thinks that Desdemona is really a witch who deliberately
betrays men, why is he talking about her in this way? Iago’s imagination
has taken such complete possession of Othello’s; so firm, so complete,
is Othello’s delusion, that he can toy, for the moment—tease
himself, perhaps—with the idea that she is as she appears, knowing,
all the while, that she is not as she appears, that the woman he had
fallen in love with was an illusion. Like Spenser’s witch Duessa (The
Faerie Queene,1590, Bk. I) she only looks beautiful and pure; in reality
she is something else entirely: bait laid to “betray” men. But to
what end? He has heard of witches who betray men but has no idea
what such betrayals are all about—who these witches are, where they
come from, why they do what they do. [Duessa’s mission is perfectly clear: to entice the unwary Christian Soldier, The RedCross Knight, from the true Protestant path. Beneath all the make-up and gorgeous clothes, her “neather parts,” are “misshapen, monstrous” and “more foule and hideous, than womans shape man would beleeve to be” and this duality is for Spenser and his readers an obvious moral and spiritual metaphor. The Catholic Church also looks mighty fine, but is, in reality, damnable.]

It seems, however, that Othello does have a purpose. We all need to
think well of ourselves; for Othello, it is a necessity: the perfect soul
must, at all costs, remain perfect. Since perfection in anything is rare
or nonexistent, one must usually be satisfied with either the appearance
of perfection or an approximation. Neither is acceptable to this
absolutist of the imagination, and in any case what he really wants is
the perfect revenge. But revenge, like murder, is ugly, and, what is
worse, common and vulgar. What to do? A simple solution presents
itself: call it something else; make it a ceremonial sacrifice of which he
 is the officiating priest. And what is the god that Desdemona is to be
sacrificed to? Othello didn’t get that far, but the answer is obvious: his
perfect soul.

Why is Othello’s poetry beautiful? Of course you may not find it so,
and in that case nothing I or anyone else can say is likely to change
your mind. What is undeniable, though, is the transformation of
Othello himself into an esthete and Desdemona into an esthetic object
which he would rather not spoil with his knife:

Yet I’ll not shed her blood
Nor scar that whiter skin of hers than snow
And smooth as monumental alabaster....

He lingers lovingly and beautifully—prolonging the moment for his
own delectation and ours, as if it were a new discovery— over the difference
between putting out a candle and putting out a life. These
reflections lead, by way of the metaphor of the rose which once
plucked “needs must wither,” to one last kiss and sniff, or two or
three, and then one more which wakes her up.
Desdemona awake and conscious is no longer a passive esthetic
object but a recalcitrant human being who strenuously resists her husband’s
accusations, hampered as she is by her own terror and her
ignorance of the details—all she knows is that she is suspected of having
an affair with Cassio.

When, in the brothel scene, Desdemona refuses to submit to the
tyrannous edicts of his fantasy, Othello pretends with acid irony to
think he has confused this innocent stranger with his wife: “I cry you
mercy then./ I took you for that cunning whore of Venice/ That married
with Othello.” (IV.2.90-2) When once more, in the murder scene,
she refuses to submit, denying that she has ever been familiar with
Cassio, or given him any “tokens,” he reacts as though he has just
been hit by a stone.

By heaven, I saw my handkerchief in’s hand!
O perjur’d woman, thou dost stone my heart
And mak’st me call what I intend to do
A murther, which I thought a sacrifice! V.2.65

How could Desdemona be guilty of perjury if she doesn’t know she’s
on trial? But Othello has lost the power to distinguish fictions from
facts. It is appropriate therefore that fictions not facts become, increasingly,
the things that he most passionately cares about. In a fantastic
reversal of the gospel story in John 8, of the woman taken in adultery
and about to be stoned, he accuses adulterous Desdemona of stoning
his innocent heart, thereby forcing him out of his calm, godlike
detachment, as suprahuman judge, into the murderously human rage
which is what he actually feels but thinks he is above.7 It is entirely in
character that he should blame his rage on Desdemona: if she is murdered
instead of sacrificed, that’s her own fault. She shouldn’t have
forced him to call things by their right names. In this furious mood, he
unceremoniously strangles her.

At the end, as the Venetian authorities are trying to make sense of this
terrible story, one of them, Lodovico, says,

O thou Othello that was once so good,
Fall’n in the practise of a damned slave,
What shall be said of thee?

To which Othello replies—ironically?
Why, any thing:
An honorable murderer, if you will;
For naught did I in hate, but all in honor. V.2.295

If he is being ironic, it is as close as he ever gets to self-knowledge.
But it’s hard to tell. Let us give him the benefit of the doubt and call
this irony. In that case, the phrase “honorable murderer” is full of self-loathing.
But he really does not want to be remembered as a common
murderer, honorable or not. So, as Othello is getting a grip on the knife
with which he intends to kill himself, he makes a final effort to set the
record straight.

Soft you; a word or two before you go.
I have done the state some service, and they know’t—
No more of that. I pray you, in your letters,
When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice. Then must you speak
Of one that lov’d not wisely but too well;
Of one not easily jealous, but being wrought,
Perplexed in the extreme; of one whose hand
(Like the base Indian) threw a pearl away
Richer than all his tribe; of one whose subdu’d eyes,
Albeit unused to the melting mood,
Drop tears as fast as the Arabian trees
Their medicinable gum. Set you down this;
And say besides that in Aleppo once,
Where a malignant and a turban’d Turk
Beat a Venetian and traduc’d the state,
I took by th’throat the circumcised dog
And smote him—thus. He stabs himself. V.2.356

No one, including Othello, knows the whole story. All he or anyone
else (on stage) knows is that Iago tricked him, his luck ran out, he lost
his way. Maybe he thinks, now, at the end of his tether, that by marrying
Desdemona he had already lost his way: that wild, free and dangerous
way of life she had romantically fallen in love with when he
had described it to her in his simple, elegant, unpretentious style. For
her, it was as if a hero had just stepped out of the literary world of
romance. Now, in his last words, he returns to that world: the story of
the Indian who threw away a pearl, those Arabian trees with their
medicinal gums (which seem to have passed into legend and folklore,
after having been described by Pliny in the first century CE). But who
is that Turk and what is he doing here? Well, it’s another story. Othello
never told it before and may not have intended to tell it now (“I have
done the state some service, and they know’t—No more of that.”),
regarding it perhaps as inconsequential. He tells it now because the
one thing he has left to be proud of is his service to the state of Venice,
and he needs to tell it now if he is to claim credit for something; and
because this particular story allows him to do two things at once: punish
himself as he had punished that malignant Turk (thus subtly identifying
himself with this enemy of Venice?), while at the same time
putting an end to his own misery.

This last speech is deeply incoherent: understanding nothing,
Othello no longer knows who he is or what to say. He holds himself
together just long enough to make a grandly histrionic statement and
gesture:

I kiss’d thee ere I kill’d thee. No way but this,
Killing myself, to die upon a kiss.

As Iago is taken away to be tortured and put to death, he stares
inscrutably at the bodies of the two extraordinary people he has gratuitously
destroyed.

Demand me nothing. What you know, you know.
From this time forth I never will speak word.

So Iago slams the door of his inner self in our faces, which is not surprising,
knowing what we know. As he informs Roderigo early in the
play, there is something even more contemptible than making an ass
of oneself: letting others know how they can make an ass of you.
To let others know how you feel or what you think is to hand them
a weapon, which will be used—against you. You might as well take
the old expression literally, and put your heart out on your sleeve for
ugly, carrion-eating birds to eat: 

For when my outward action doth demonstrate
The native act and figure of my heart
In complement extern, ’tis not long after
But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve
For daws to peck at. I am not what I am. I.1.65

Iago seals this confession with a riddle: “I am not what I am.” Like
Jehovah’s “I am that I am” which it parodies, Iago’s riddle defies
rational scrutiny. This is a man who, like Jehovah, intends to be
unknowable. That’s impossible. Everyone, including Jehovah, leaves a
trail. Just as we can learn quite a bit about Iago by reading this play,
we learn all sorts of things about Jehovah by reading the Bible.
We know, for instance, that Iago despises Othello and Desdemona
as pretentious frauds: peel away the glamor and romance and you’ll
find that they are just like everyone else. As the thrill of sex with a
black man wears off, Desdemona will become increasingly bored by
Othello. Then she’ll take another lover. Othello will find out about it
and kill them both. As Iago sees the business, he is merely apeeding up
a process that is naturally bound to occur anyway, and sooner
rather than later. Why should someone else have the pleasure of
watching the eternal story of lust, boredom, betrayal, disillusion, and
hate play itself out? (There’s more than a bit of Thersites in Iago.)
This is not a play about motiveless malignity, as Coleridge thought, or
at least not quite. Iago has a motive for his malignity: pure entertainment.
It is strictly for his own amusement that Iago takes advantage
of Othello’s simplicity to educate him about the ways of the world.

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Hamlet: Tragic Virtue

Shakespeare was interested in the way insignificant persons can change, promote or derail the schemes of their betters while mindlessly pursuing their own eccentric and unrelated schemes. What the gentlemen of Messina (Much Ado About Nothing) are too stupid to discover, a shallow fool, Dogberry, brings to light. Poor instruments, as Cleopatra says, may do noble deeds. Or they may change the course of history in a way that no one could have predicted. Polonius in Hamlet, like Lucio in Measure for Measure, is important because of his self-importance, his lack of self-awareness and his simplicity: he makes things happen because he is a simple minded busybody who doesn’t know what he is doing. Hamlet, notoriously, does not know what he is doing either; but Hamlet knows it.

It is Polonius who decides that Hamlet must be mad—so much in love with Polonius’s daughter that he goes mad indeed when she jilts him—and sets up the scenes that put this idea, and more, to the test. It is Polonius’s insatiable appetite for information and his itch to be at the center of things that keeps him busy and conspicuous for more than half the play, and finally kills him. As he bustles about in pursuit of his idée fixe, the audience begins to take his measure even as that audience is being perplexed by Hamlet. Knowing nothing about love or madness, Polonius sets up a series of scenes in order to test his hypothesis. None of these scenes go as he expects. Intentions always go awry in Hamlet—that principle is embedded in the structure of the play—and the intentions of Polonius are as important for the seemingly
aimless action of this play as are those of the ghost. In the chaotic economy of Hamlet, this man who never knows what he is doing is an appropriately unwitting agent.

Polonius is an old man on whom everything is lost. Insults go right over his head. People like him have been the stock in trade of comic playwrights and novelists for the last four hundred years. Why this tragedy should require such a comically obtuse fellow to move it along is an interesting and important question.

Since Hamlet is disinclined to act, someone else must do so if there is to be a play at all. The hero, throughout, is almost entirely passive, responding merely to people who come to him, or to traps that others have designed. The only action that Hamlet initiates is a play, The Murder of Gonzago, and he would never have thought of it if a troupe of actors had not happened to come to Elsinore. Nor would he have figured out the truth about how his father died on his own (though he has his suspicions); the spirit of his father has to tell him.

There is one moment in the play when one might be tempted to take Polonius seriously. His advice to his son is almost as famous as Hamlet’s “To be or not to be” soliloquy. No one ever quotes the bitter wisdom of the Player King, but everyone knows at least some of the rules of prudent lifesmanship on which Polonius lectures Laertes, especially the complacent admonition,

This above all: to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man. I.3.78-80


Bunkum. The scoundrels and con artists of the world are certainly notbeing false to themselves as they ply their trades. Iago is being perfectly true to himself—insofar as he or anyone else understands thatself—as he deceives Othello. There could be a connection between
self-knowledge and morality; that depends on the self and its principles.


Polonius, complacent and infatuated with his own eloquence, does not understand that he is merely uttering platitudes: his advice to Laertes does not come from inner experience but from books, the literary tradition of such fatherly advice being already both ancient and
well-known in 1600. And since his idea is only a platitude, it carries no weight and is easily forgotten. It is no help at all when difficult choices have to be made. So Laertes, who prides himself on being a gentleman and man of honor, is oblivious to the dishonorable nature
of the plot that he and Claudius jointly hatch against Hamlet’s life in Act V. Like father, like son. Having neither inner selves nor principles to be true or false to, they have no internalized sense of shame. They are not morally autonomous agents but creatures, rather, of an inauthentic world of fashion, gossip, rumor, prejudice, platitudes, conventional niceties, received opinions. The court at Elsinore, like any social institution, is full of people just like them: not villainous characters for the most part, not smilers with knives like Claudius, but ordinary people who also take their selves and principles for granted and can only be shamed by some form of public exposure.

Polonius’s comic scene with Reynaldo shows us a man who is willing to risk dishonoring his son in order to enjoy, vicariously, the life that he thinks his son is living in gay Paree. It is a scene that seems to serve no particular dramatic purpose, one of the scenes, perhaps, that Samuel Johnson was complaining about in his notes, “that neither forward nor retard” the action of the play. But it tells us something important about Polonius. It brings out his avidity for information at any cost, and it suggests a possible parallel with Hamlet’s real father: each is parasitic on the life of his son, and each is indifferent to the fact that, by using his son to satisfy his own passion or curiosity, he puts him at risk. But, because the scene is lightly handled, as if to bring out the comic irrelevance of Polonius, audiences are unlikely to connect the scene or horrendous visitation that has just taken place. The scene belongs to the banal world of a court inhabited by mediocrities, not monsters. As Nicholas Grene aptly remarks, “Part of Hamlet’s difficulty in executing his father’s commands is the very banality of the world in which he
finds himself. The world of Hamlet is an ordinary world, a world of the morally second-rate." The ghost is still very much a part of that world, in his contempt for his brother and his passion for revenge, a motive which, while understandable, is not only unchristian but second-rate
by any civilized standard. That’s why he is in Purgatory: he’s too virtuous for Hell, too earth-bound for Heaven.

Hamlet, like Romeo and Juliet, has a pair of star-crossed lovers, but Hamlet and Ophelia never have a chance to escape from Denmark, or even to think about it; their affair is snuffed out almost as soon as it begins. The combined action of necessity and contingency in the earlier
tragedy is crystal clear; the tragic machinery works like a clock, all its gears and levers in plain view. Nothing is simple or clear in Hamlet, least of all the reasons that lead Polonius to decide that Ophelia should end her tentative love affair with the prince. The scene in which she is
forced to do so is as important as are the ghost’s revelations for the future action of the play, and Shakespeare wastes no time in putting it before us.

Quite spontaneously, it seems, Polonius and Laertes gang up on Ophelia and force her to break off relations with Hamlet. As if speaking with one mind, they tell her that Hamlet is just like other men; all he cares about is sex. Don’t trust him; he will tell you anything to get
you into his bed; once bedded, soon forgotten. (Polonius’s remarks in this respect are particularly rank, gross and cynical.) This accusation is not, as it happens, entirely gratuitous, as Hamlet himself knows only too well: his mother has just made it clear to anyone with eyes to see and ears to hear that she is a vigorously sexual being and doesn’t care who knows it. She just couldn’t wait, it seems, to get into her brotherin- law’s bed—not even one month, says Hamlet when we meet him for the first time. Like mother, like son? Neither Polonius nor Leartes would be so stupid as to say such a thing. They don’t have to. They are not afraid that Hamlet won’t marry Ophelia (which is what they tell her) but that he will. Her name, a transliteration of the ancient Greek word for gain, profit or advantage, ofeilia, shows exactly what she means to her father and brother. These men are entirely dependent on royal favor and they do not want to be on the losing side of the coup d’etat that has just taken place and may soon claim another victim. Anyone who knows anything about the ways of the political
world—and Polonius certainly considers himself to be very wise about such things—would assume that Hamlet probably does not have long to live. Ophelia mustn’t have anything to do with him. Since this scene precedes the Ghost’s account of how poison had been poured into his ear, and the lies with which the ear of Denmark has been abused in the ensuing cover-up, the audience may not see Polonius’s assault as a metaphorical poisoning. It is only in retrospect,
knowing the play as a whole, that the meaning of the scene becomes clear: character assassination. It is as if this play about doubt and uncertainty were willing for a time to give Polonius and Laertes the benefit of the doubt.

Polonius and Laertes think they are protecting themselves and Ophelia by preventing her from marrying the Prince. Instead, their efforts serve to draw them into the conflict that will destroy them all.

Intentions always go awry in this play, as we have already noted. The well-known gap between Hamlet’s intention to avenge the death of his father, and the actions that such an intention requires, coincides with a hole in playtime that the play hides with one hand and reveals with the other. When Hamlet exits, at the end of I.5, saying “the time is out of joint”, the clocks in Denmark stop and are not restarted for at least two months. How do we know? Because Hamlet makes a joke about the power of time to assuage grief as he is chatting with Ophelia before the opening of his play. When she asks him why he is so merry, he replies with cheerful malice, “What should a man do but be merry, for look you how cheerfully my mother looks,
and my father died within’s two hours.” “Nay,” replies Ophelia, “Tis twice two months.” (Hamlet, in his reply, acts as if he hasn’t heard that word “twice”—or doesn’t want to hear it.) We already know, from Hamlet’s first soliloquy, that his father has been dead for not quite two months when the play begins. (Gertrude marries Claudius less than a month after the death of Hamlet Senior. About a month later, his ghost begins to walk.) So Hamlet sits on what he learns from the ghost fortwo months, which may feel like two hours to him, and does nothing. Or almost nothing, for he does manage to speak and behave in such a way as to attract attention and alarm the King. So empty is this time, otherwise, that the play virtually ignores it; for that, as Granville-Barker acutely notes in his discussion of the play, is what Hamlet is doing.

“It would never occur to us,” says Harold Jenkins in his introduction to the Arden edition, “that Hamlet is neglecting his revenge if he refrained from saying so himself”—unless we happen to have noticed how much time has elapsed between the end of the first act and the beginning of the second. Since no audience is likely to pick up on the fact that a crucial two months of Hamlet’s life are unaccounted for, Shakespeare could only draw our attention to the fact that Hamlet is neglecting his duty by having him talk about it.

This analysis of play time may be pedantry but it is not idle; the deviousness of the play forces us into it. The question is, why doesn’t Shakespeare treat this matter in a more straightforward way? Why not make it clear to the audience, in no uncertain terms, that time passes and nothing happens? Why not be a little more explicit about the kind of behavior that is upsetting the court, alarming the King, and making people like Polonius think Hamlet’s gone mad? We can infer Shakespeare’s intentions from what we know about the play and the literary tradition (or traditions) from which it emerged. (See my other essay on this play, "Hamlet: The Madness and The Critics.)

Whatever really happens—or doesn’t happen—to Hamlet as a consequence of the ghost’s horrific revelations has to remain as obscure to the audience as it is to Hamlet and those around him; we can’t understand him any better than he understands himself, which is not at all. 

Hamlet no longer knows who he is; he has lost his way and knows it. That is a postulate of the play: This is not a play about a man who can’t make up his mind, as Lawrence Olivier says at the beginning of his film, but a man who is remaking his mind and self as he goes along. That is why the play, as Goethe observed (a brilliant insight which he made no further use of) seems to have no plan. As Granville-Barker might have said, Hamlet seems to be making itself up as it goes along because that is what Hamlet himself is doing.

It took a long time for the deviousness of Hamlet—its radical strangeness—to sink in.
Thomas Kenny, in 1864, seems to have been the first person to notice this quality:

“Hamlet is, perhaps, of all the plays of Shakespeare the one which a great actor would
find most difficult to embody in an ideally complete form. It would, we think, be a mistake
to attempt to elaborate its multiform details into any distinctly harmonious whole.
Its whole action is devious, violent, spasmodic. Its distempered, inconstant irritability is
its very essence. Its only order is the manifestation of a wholly disordered energy.”

The spirit of Virgil, Dante’s literary hero, is sent from Heaven to rescue him from fear and
confusion, and set him on the right path at the beginning of The Divine Comedy. No spirit, from an intact literary or spiritual tradition, is available to rescue Hamlet from his fear
and confusion. The spirit that comes to show him his way is the single-minded and morally questionable ghost of his father, released momentarily from Purgatory, and the path he puts him on is that of a moribund theatrical tradition, the revenge play.

One of the most striking facts about Hamlet is the speed with which this man forgets this ghost and the dreadful task it has laid upon him. “Remember me,” it commands, but that as Hamlet quickly learns, is beyond his power. Do we forget what we want to forget? In almost no
time at all the ghost becomes a distant, if oppressive, memory, and Hamlet, who has no idea why he wants to put it out of his mind, becomes a mystery to all including himself.

The only person not confounded by Hamlet is Polonius, the great explainer, a man who knows little but thinks he is wise. Nothing can shake his confidence in his own perspicacity and what it tells him about Hamlet. But since the wisdom of Polonius is strictly conventional, while wit is surprising and original, it is only natural that Hamlet should remain an enigma to him; or that
he should confuse what in Hamlet is authentically strange or wayward with madness.

Anyone, like Hamlet, who tries to reconstruct or reimagine himself is likely to seem strange or even mad to those to those who have always been able take themselves for granted. What's it like when one can't do that? When all your assumptions about yourself and your place in the world are slipping away? Reconstructing a self is a desperate act, like sawing off the branch you are sitting on; you wouldn’t do it if you didn’t have to. There are no rules, charts or guidebooks. It is easy to make unforgivable mistakes, take a wrong turn, get irretrievably lost, go mad indeed.

Madness is still a mystery. We have names for conditions that we think we know something about, like schizophrenia or depression, but then we have this word, 'madness', which refers to something huge and scary and unknown, and we have another word, 'mad' that is used to describe actions or attitudes that we don't understand or fear or disapprove of: the words and actions of Hamlet, for example.  Madness, in other words, is often a matter of opinion.
 
The fact that it is Polonius, of all people, who pronounces Hamlet to be mad is a reason not to take that diagnosis at face value, especially when you consider the absurd scene (II.2) in which he serves it up to the King and Queen. Nowhere else in this play will you find a more naively confident display of intellectual impotence. Polonius’s ostentatious display of rhetorical foot-work is comic, in part, because it doesn’t do quite what he intends it to do. He wants to impress the King and Queen with his perspicacity and knowledge and doesn’t hear the note of impatience in Gertrude’s terse command to get on with it: “more matter with less art”. It would never occur to him that his art reveals an absence of matter. “What is madness?” he asks. Why, “what is’t but to be nothing else but mad?” This delightfully simple-minded tautology is followed by an engagingly self-satisfied grammatical pun, as the madness of Hamlet is “declined”:

And he repelled, a short tale to make,
Fell into a sadness, then into a fast,
Thence to a watch, thence into a weakness,
Thence to a lightness, and, by this declension,
Into the madness wherein now he raves,
And all we mourn for. II.2.151


We should not be too scornful of Polonius’s efforts here. Forced to define the nature of madness, few of us would be able to improve much on his rhetorical question.

Polonius’s attempt to communicate the incommunicable can be compared to Hamlet’s, as described by Ophelia in her account of his visit. Polonius’s account is all art and no matter. Hamlet’s body-language is clearly expressive, but of what? Polonius’s rhetoric is intended
to conceal but actually reveals the fact that he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. Hamlet seems to have something to say that he either cannot or will not reveal, but it is also possible that, like Polonius, he doesn’t know what he’s doing.

He looked, says Ophelia, “As if he had been loosed out of hell to speak of horrors.” Hamlet Sr.’s ghost had been loosed out of purgatory to speak of horrors. Is that what Hamlet wanted to speak to her about?—the burden that had recently been placed upon him by his dead father? For a man who is as suspicious of seeming as he is, he seems (as Ophelia describes him) to be putting on an extraordinarily theatrical performance. But what is it a performance of? The horrific experience of talking to a dead man? The metaphorical hell of the abandoned lover? Or is he regretfully abandoning her? Is he mocking the theatrical gestures of despair, or naturally falling into them, or both? No one knows, including Hamlet, who, for the moment, at least, is so distraught that doesn't know if he is coming or going.

Shakespeare put this scene into indirect discourse to avoid having to include stage directions at least as elaborate as those describing the pantomime in The Murder of Gonzago. Here too we can make a pretty good guess about Shakespeare’s reasons: by putting his stage directions
into Ophelia’s mouth, Shakespeare avoids the necessity of having to commit himself and the play to a particular interpretation of Hamlet’s gestures. Shakespeare must have wanted the meaning of this scene to be enigmatic. Hamlet is clearly in despair, but why? Polonius, in his simplicity, thinks he knows.

From this strange pantomime much follows, including the scenes in which Polonius puts his ideas about Hamlet’s madness to the test. The first of these tests (in II.2), in which Polonius is
invited to see himself as a fishmonger, is comic in the way a conversation can be when one person is fishing for information and gets more than he bargains for (and more than he can understand), and because of the way Hamlet dangles the really interesting bits just out of Polonius’s reach.

Though it’s a bit of a reach for the audience, it is not impossible to follow the string of associations that link fishmongers to dead dogs to kissing carrion to Ophelia. The unifying conception, clearly, is sex: the randy sexuality of Gertrude, the congenital randiness with which Polonius has just besmirched the character of Hamlet, the randiness associated with fishmongers’ daughters (in 1600), the universal randiness of nature which breeds maggots promiscuously in dead dogs and dead kings—and will soon breed them in us all. What’s of particular interest is the logic that leads Polonius by the nose to the seething, stinking carcass that has been prepared just for him: a wittily fit comeuppance for his lies. “You think you know all about sex do you?”( Hamlet seems to be saying). “You don’t know the half of it. Nature is one huge sexpot, all she cares about is reproduction, and that beautiful daughter you think you’re protecting is as much a part of nature as you or me or my mother. Watch out: if the sun can breed maggots in a dead dog just by looking at it, what might it do to some really choice carrion?—your naturally randy daughter, for instance. Better yet, what might a man do?—the son of a king, say. Don’t let her out of your sight.”

This is not the man that Ophelia has just described, so distraught he doesn’t know what to say. When we see him here he is in such perfect control of his words and meanings that he can use them for his own amusement and ours; as if the self he is reconstructing has suddenly
taken shape.

Hamlet is not a humorless plotter like Brutus, but a man who is better at making jokes about his situation than he is at changing it. He'd rather cut up his enemies with wit than a sword. Just to be sure we fully take in the feline delicacy of Hamlet’s wit, Shakespeare has him make a mirror of it for Polonius to look into.

Pol. What do you read, my lord?
Ham. Words, words, words.
Pol. What is the matter, my lord?
Ham. Between who?
Pol. I mean the matter that you read, my lord.
Ham. Slanders, sir; for the satirical rogue says here that old
men have gray beards, that their faces are wrinkled, their eyes
purging thick amber and plum-tree gum, and that they have a
plentiful lack of wit, together with most weak hams; all which,
sir, though I most powerfully and potently believe, yet I hold it
not honesty to have it thus set down, for yourself, sir, shall
grow old as I am, if like a crab you could go backward.

II.2.204

This is wit for wit’s sake. It doesn’t do any work in the play; it is play, not work. And while wit can be cruel, it can also be beautiful. The matter that oozes from old eyes that are no longer good for much— Polonius’s as we know are especially purblind—could have been imagined in some pretty ugly ways, but is here whimsically transformed into a substance that manages to be, ambiguously, not only thick and gummy but exotic, precious, even fragrant. It is a delicate touch, as is the crab that Polonius suddenly becomes, scuttling backward in time to recover his lost youth. Polonius was a young man once; not only handsome but witty—perhaps.

Hamlet is a satirical rogue but not of the rough, shaggy sort that Renaissance etymologists assumed to be lurking behind the word ‘satire’ which, they thought, was derived from ‘satyr.’ His wit often has the lightness of touch we have just observed, even when he is being coarse (by our standards), as in his conversation with Ophelia before and during the performance of his play. A. C. Bradley found such frank joking about sexual matters unforgivable and could not imagine how any lady could tolerate it. But Ophelia doesn’t seem to mind overmuch and is no more heavy-handed in her rebuke than Hamlet is in his jokes. “You are naught, you are naught,” she says and that “naught” has about as much force behind it as “naughty” would today. She is as playful in her way as he is in his. The deranged misogyny (“I have heard of your paintings wellenough....You jig and amble, and you lisp...”) of the nunnery scene (in III.1) seems to have been easily forgiven and forgotten.

The conversation that most obviously combines work (the work of inquiry) and play occurs when Hamlet has his first meeting with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern:

Ham. My excellent good friends! How dost thou,
Guildenstern? Ah, Rosencranz! Good lads, how do you both?
Ros. As the indifferent children of the earth.
Guil. Happy, in that we are not over-happy, on Fortune’s capwe are not the very button.
Ham. Nor the soles of her shoe?
Ros. Neither, my lord.

Ham. Then you live about her waist, or in the middle of her favors?
Guil. Faith, her privates we.
Ham. In the secret parts of Fortune? O, most true, she is a strumpet. What news?
Ros. None, my lord, but the world’s grown honest.
Ham. Then is doomsday near. But your news is not true. Let me question more in particular.
II.2.239

Though the tone is playful, the inquiry is not. When Rosencranz and Guildenstern identify themselves, deprecatingly, as fortune’s “privates” in both senses of the word, they think Hamlet won’t get their private joke. Wrong: he learns from their own mouths that they are shameless and will do anything, no matter how obscene, for pay. Asked for the latest news, they think they are being slick when they say that “the world’s grown honest.” They think Hamlet won’t get the
point—that they have come to sell their shifty services to this crooked King because they could not find anyone else who would hire such a pair of unconscionable rascals. Wrong again. Goethe thought it a particular stroke of genius that there should be two of these fellows instead of one:

What these two persons are and do, it is impossible to represent by one. In such small matters we discover Shakespeare’s greatness. This lightly stepping approach, this smirking and
bowing, this assenting, wheedling, flattering, this whisking agility, this wagging of the tail, this allness and emptiness, this legal knavery, this ineptitude and insipidity—how can they be
expressed in a single man? There ought to be dozens of these people, if they could be had; for it is only in society that they are anything: they are society itself; and Shakespeare showed
no little wisdom and discernment in bringing in a pair of them.


Like Polonius, who also knows what side his bread is buttered on, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are shameless; like Laertes, they have no morally autonomous selves to be true to. Like societies, like nations, like kings, they have interests, not morals. Claudius is different
because he can be shamed.

Hamlet’s playfulness manifests itself in other ways. The very first thing Hamlet does with the information that the ghost has given him about his uncle is to gleefully turn it into a truth universally acknowledged (at least in Denmark): “that one may smile, and smile, and be a
villain”. This is followed by the mock-serious tautology, “There’s never a villain dwelling in all Denmark but he’s an arrant knave”. (And then the scene slides off into farce—in which even the ghost participates.) The first thing Hamlet does when his play achieves its intended purpose
and sends the King off the stage, screaming for light, is play: first with Guildenstern (“Will you play upon this pipe?”) and then with Polonius (“Do you see yonder cloud . . .?”). What does Hamlet do with Polonius’s body? Play with it, of course: “Safely stowed.” When the King demands, “Where’s Polonius?”, the reply is witty and pointed: “At dinner.” And so is the ensuing dialogue about worms and beggars and kings. It is mad—or manic—wit to be sure, and also perfectly genuine: not an act but the gallows humor of a man, virtually at the end
of his tether, who knows that Nature is all there is. When you’re dead, you’re dead, “that’s the end” (having completely forgotten, once more, that he has just seen a ghost.) The end of life for everyone, kings or beggars, is to become food for maggots—to be recycled, not resurrected.
This strikes Hamlet, beset by men who don’t understand that they too are nothing but worms’ meat, as a great joke; the fact that they don’t get it makes it funnier still. It is, of course, no time for joking, but that’s the point: having run out of time, all he can do is mock the fools who have cornered him. And so once more Hamlet dramatizes the fact that playing, not acting, is what he’s best at.

The Murder of Gonzago (which seems to have been entirely of Shakespeare’s devising) is Hamlet’s one carefully planned act. It is fiction, or as Polonius would say, a bait of falsehood to catch a carp of truth. Like Polonius, Hamlet hopes by indirection to find direction out.
It does not occur to him that while he may catch “the conscience of the king,” he will also have lost his one advantage in his deadly game by revealing what he knows.

Hamlet’s play has other consequences that no one could have predicted: the death of Polonius, the redemption of Gertrude, Hamlet’s exile and return, the madness and death of Ophelia, and so on, concluding finally with the death of Hamlet and the triumph of Norway over Denmark.

The strangest thing about The Murder of Gonzago is the way it reflects on the larger play of which it is a part. The Player King, for example, takes a tolerant view of his wife’s inconstancy, which he regards as inevitable. Speaking to the Player Queen about his approaching death (from sickness or old age as he thinks), he reflects sadly but realistically on the fragility of promises and the weakness of the will in a changing world:

I do believe you think what now you speak,
But what we do determine, oft we break.
Purpose is but the slave to memory,
Of violent birth, but poor validity,
Which now, the fruit unripe, sticks on the tree,
But fall unshaken when they mellow be.
Most necessary ’tis that we forget
To pay ourselves what to ourselves is debt.
What to ourselves in passion we propose,
The passion ending, doth the purpose lose.
III.2.195

Inconstancy is natural and inevitable, virtually a law of nature. So general are the terms of this law of universal frailty that it applies to Hamlet as well as to his mother. In the heat of passion, he swears a great oath of revenge; the passion ending, as all passions must, something
happens to that passionate purpose. It gets lost, and from time to time we find Hamlet trying to bring it back. When the players arrive, fortuitously, the speech he asks for is a horrendous description of Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, taking hideous revenge on Priam for the
death of his father. But if Hamlet expects the example of Pyrrhus to whet his blunted purpose, he is mistaken. Much to his surprise and mortification, it is the artificial tears of the player, weeping for Hecuba, that shame him. And while he uses the example of the player’s tears
to whip himself into imagined violence (“. . . I should have fatted all the region kites,/With this slave’s offal”), the form of action he finally hits upon is nothing so primitive as the revenge of Pyrrhus, “mincing” the limbs of Priam with his sword while Hecuba is forced to watch; far from it. Putting on a play that strips your enemy of his lies, exposing him for what he is, is not only more civilized but more elegant, as well as morally superior. Under the primitive political circumstances in which Hamlet finds himself, however, it is not enough. If he doesn’t kill the King, the King will kill him. But Hamlet, for all his wit, does not understand this elementary political fact.

The whole play is like that: events slipping and sliding out of control, taking turns that had not been intended or foreseen. In this play, people have only momentary control over the consequences of their words and actions, which is another way of saying that things rarely go as
expected. Johnson criticizes Hamlet for being “rather an instrument than an agent,” but that is a distinction that the play seems to have been designed to blur.

Hamlet is an ironist, and irony, we commonly think, is incompatible with sincerity. Hamlet shows us that the common view is wrong: irony makes it possible to be sincere in a corrupted and corrupting world. Irony can be a form of honesty. So Hamlet always means what he says
even if he does not always say all that he means. Anyone who can maintain that precarious balance is an ironist—a sincere ironist.

Hamlet, to be sure, doesn’t always know all that he means. Nor does he always keep his balance; no one does. We are like him in that if in little else.

He loses his balance, most notably, when he falls into the trap set for him by Polonius and the King, with Ophelia as bait, and treats her, as Johnson remarks, with “useless and wanton cruelty.” Just when he thinks he has figured out why people consent to remain in this world
despite its multitudinous insults and indignities, he comes upon Ophelia. He had forgotten all about her, just as he forgets from time to time about the job he has been given to do. The great meditation on being and not being gives no more weight to dispised love than to the law’s delay or the insolence of office, and ignores Woman and Sex altogether. There are worse indignities to a noble mind, perhaps, than the pangs of dispised love: there are the pangs of desire.

Johnson assumes that Hamlet is playing the madman in this scene which, it seems, is how (in the eighteenth century) the scene had always been played. It seems to me, however, that Hamlet has every reason to be incensed when Ophelia assumes, as if she doesn’t know better, that it was Hamlet who dumped her instead of the other way around. He’s not mad, or pretending to be, but angry. For once he says all that he means, and more, without a trace of irony.

Though he begins by talking to Ophelia as a person, he ends by treating her as an abstraction, Woman. What irritates him about Woman is her power as a sexual being to distract and confuse Man: not her weakness, or “frailty” but her power to remind men that they are part of the dung and the mire of Nature whether they like it or not, “nailed,” as Montaigne says, to the worst place in the universe. To be part of Nature is to be a sexual being, driven to procreate by the lash of desire, like everything else that flies or swims or crawls. The disgusting work of generation never stops.

Hamlet can only remove himself from Nature and its promiscuous sexuality by ignoring the fact that he too is a sexual being. Woman with her wiles is in league with Nature to prevent that and Ophelia, poor girl, gets the blame. She becomes, in his eyes, Woman. Ophelia, the unique, suffering person, no longer exists, no longer counts, sacrificed like Jephthah’s daughter to an abstraction. No one—not Hamlet, her father or the King—cares a pin for her pain and confusion. It is the most painful and tragic scene in the play, a wretched confusion of cross purposes and missed opportunities. In that sense, the scene is characteristic of the play as a whole, even as it shows us a side of Hamlet we haven’t seen before by dramatizing a failure of wit and intelligence and a loss of self-possession.

Hamlet is ordinarily the most self-possessed of characters and his wit is ordinarily in complete possession of its own meanings. This enables him to control almost every conversation, as he dominates every scene. None of the other characters is aware of the power or speed of Hamlet’s mind. Since they can’t follow him, they think he may be mad. It is another paradox of this most paradoxical of plays, that the wittiest person in it is commonly thought to have lost his wits.

Though the word ‘mad’ may be the unconscious tribute that mediocrities pay to wit, the mediocrities are not necessarily wrong in thinking, or at least suspecting, that madness and wit are related. The intellectual elite of Shakespeare’s day thought so too. Shakespeare
didn’t have to read Montaigne—though he probably did—to ask Montaigne’s question:

Of what is the subtlest madness made but the subtlest wisdom? As great enmities are born of great friendships, and mortal maladies of vigorous health, so are the greatest and wildest manias born of the rare and lively stirrings of the soul; it is only a half-turn of the peg to pass from the one to the other. In the actions of the insane we see how neatly madness
combines with the most vigorous operations of our soul. Who does not know how imperceptibly near is madness to the lusty flights of a free mind and the effects of supreme and extraordinary virtue?


Hamlet can be thought of as a gloss on this passage. How is madness related to wisdom, and wisdom to madness? And what’s the difference? These are questions that the play raises. Hamlet’s wit characteristically walks a thin line between the subtlest madness and the
subtlest wisdom. There are no sign posts to tell either him or us when he is going astray. Instead of taking conventional meanings of ‘madness’ and ‘reason’ for granted, Shakespeare leaves them open, undefined and as ambiguous and uncertain as they are in life.

Hamlet’s famously delayed revenge is not a problem which has to be explained if we are to understand the play; it’s what makes the play possible. To adapt T. S. Eliot’s metaphor for the function of meaning in poetry, Hamlet’s revenge is like the piece of meat that the burglar
throws the dog to keep it quiet while he steals the family jewels. While we are waiting for Hamlet’s revenge to be consummated, we are being entertained and educated by his wit (and Shakespeare’s), and robbed of our illusions: that we always know where we are, who we are, what we are doing, and why; or that we know what reason is, or wisdom, or folly, or madness. Uneasily situated between the subtlest wisdom and the subtlest madness, and sharing our uncertainty as to which is which, the wayward wit of Hamlet is well placed to unsettle the rational conventions we live by. And one of the most important of these is the idea that the thing that separates us from the beasts—reason, discourse, foresight—gives us the power to control our lives and control events in the world. “Sure he that made us,” says Hamlet in his frustration,

with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To fust in us unus’d.
IV.4.39

Hamlet is not the only one who has a right to feel frustrated by the impotence of reason. His father and his uncle might as well have let their reason fust for all the good it does them. Every plan or plot is dogged by the law of unintended consequences. In the final catastrophe, whatever can go wrong does go wrong. The King dies but, unluckily, so do the Queen and the Prince. “The apparition left the regions of the dead to little purpose; the revenge which he demands is not obtained but by the death of him that was required to take it”, remarks Johnson with his usual intelligence.

What Johnson took to be a fault in the play can also be understood as an intentional irony that frames it. The first thing we learn about the dead King is that he fought and won a duel with Fortinbras’ father over some territory that had been in dispute between Norway and
Denmark. The play ends with the destruction of Denmark’s royal family and the loss of Danish independence. Denmark is in the bag and Fortinbras has only to claim it.

By putting revenge above every other value or consideration, the ghost of Hamlet’s father destroys everything he had cared about in life. The Player King, Hamlet’s other and wiser father, would have known better than to try to impose his will on the living from beyond
the grave. Curiously, it is this character from Hamlet’s own play, a figment of his imagination as it were, who emphatically enunciates the principle or law of unexpected consequences that is embedded in the paradoxical action of the play as a whole:

But orderly to end where I begun,
Our wills and fates do so contrary run
That our devices still are overthrown:
Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own.
III.2.213


One can pretend to be mad but not witty; such counterfeits are exposed in a hurry. If you think that Hamlet’s jokes, which no one else ever seems to get, are merely the “antic disposition” we are warned about at the end of Act I, you will at least concede that they are sui generis, not something put on, or faked for the occasion. Maybe he’s pretending to be mad, maybe not; there’s no way to settle the point (Polonius, for one, isn’t sure what to think: “Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t”), but either way it is a demonstration of spontaneous
intellectual and imaginative energy. There’s nothing forced about Hamlet’s wit; it is who he is, whether he is putting on an act, as some think, or merely being himself. But who is he? Horatio’s “sweet prince” or a cold-blooded killer? Is Hamlet the only sincere person in
the play, as William Empson and Lionel Trilling propose, or as devious and dishonest in his own way as Claudius is in his? Is the wickedness of Hamlet’s wit a healthy antidote to the hypocrisy of Polonius and the court, or is it just wicked?— “diseased,” as he himself, at one point, is prepared to concede. Is Hamlet, as many critics have concluded, the unwitting carrier of the poison or disease that is rotting the state of Denmark? Or is he, as Simon Russell Beale presented him in a production by the Royal National Theater, some years ago, a man who has
lost his way? His humanistic assumptions about the sovereignty of reason, the dignity of man and the goodness of the world having been suddenly whisked out from under him, Hamlet is thrown back on his own inner resources. (Christian piety, it is worth noticing, is not an
option.) Such a spiritual crisis, far more common in 1600 than is generally realized, makes Hamlet our contemporary.

If there is critical consensus on these questions just now, it is not in Hamlet’s favor. The eighteenth, nineteenth and early-to-mid twentieth-century critics seemed to like him on the whole, while disapproving of his treatment of Ophelia, his neglect of duty, or his attempt
to play god with the life of Claudius. Late twentieth-century opinion seems to have turned increasingly hostile. Having for several years followed conversations about Hamlet on the internet (the Shaksper[sic] mailing list edited by Hardy Cook), I would say that he is more
likely to be characterized as devious than as sincere, and not a sweet prince at all but a bully and a killer. Much of the animus seems to derive from confusion about the roles of Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and especially the manner in which they meet their
deaths: are they innocent victims of a senseless struggle for power or do they, as Hamlet thinks, merely get what they deserve? A substantial majority seems to regard them as the former.

They are not innocent victims. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are not the innocent bumblers that Tom Stoppard makes them out to be in his play, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead. They are corrupt, serviceable villains like Oswald in King Lear. Polonius is the King’s
self-appointed secret agent. He is killed because he is in a place where he should not have been, eavesdropping on a conversation that is none of his business.

Polonius’s death occurs at a crucial moment in the play and one that he himself, as usual, has set up (III.1.187): “after the play/ Let his queen-mother all alone entreat him...And I’ll be plac’d... in the ear/ Of all their conference.” Polonius gets himself killed because he interferes
just when Hamlet is about to do the one thing that he wants to do more than anything else: force his mother to see herself as the shameless person that she has become and reclaim her from the phony, sleazy world of the Poloniuses, Claudiuses, Rosencrantzes and
Guildensterns. Only then can she become a real—i.e. morally autonomous—person. Hamlet succeeds in this project but it is not easy. Gertrude, naturally, does not want to see herself as she is. She puts up a struggle, and this struggle, when she cries out in fear for her life, costs Polonius his. Hamlet, already perhaps regretting his failure to kill the King when he had him at his mercy (in III.3) and thinking he has been given a second chance, joyfully stabs him through the arras. Neither Hamlet nor Gertrude gives the matter more than a passing thought. This is rather heartless of them no doubt, but Hamlet is right: Polonius was asking for it. Spying is risky business; don’t complain if you get hurt.

The unease and even outright dislike that Hamlet inspires can’t, I think, be entirely accounted for by his callous dismissal of Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, or even by the seemingly gratuitous cruelty toward Ophelia in the nunnery scene (III.1). It is not so much
what Hamlet does that bothers people but what he is: a “corrosive inwardness” (Stephen Greenblatt’s term, I think) that completely dominates the play. We are unwilling to believe that such inwardness might be a normal concomittant to the moral autonomy that Hamlet is
trying to retain: though he has temporarily lost his bearings, it never occurs to him to fall mindlessly back on some conventional code of honor or duty or piety. Our modern word for the condition that Hamlet is trying to retain is “authenticity,” a word which no longer refers,
merely, to the provenance of certain documents or works of art, but also defines a state of being that the irresistible power of the modern corporate state has forced us to demand and invent; what the poet, Marianne Moore, calls “a place for the genuine.”

Surely, we may think, the strikingly inward consciousness of this man—so sudden, strange, wayward, and in the end, self-defeating—though obviously brilliant and original, must also be pathological. This is the line that critics were beginning to take toward the end of the
eighteenth century and which became hugely influential when Coleridge took it up, giving it an appearance of philosophical plausibility in his lectures of 1808 and 1812. 

“In order to understand Hamlet, it is essential that we should reflect on the constitution of our own minds. Man is distinguished from the brute animals in proportion as thought prevails over sense; but in the healthy processes of the mind, a balance is constantly maintained between the impressions from outward objects and the inward operations of the intellect; for if there be an overbalance in the contemplative faculty, man thereby becomes the creature of mere meditation, and loses his natural power of action....In Hamlet
[Shakespeare] seems to have wished to exemplify the moral necessity of a due balance between our attention to the objects of our senses and our meditation on the working of our
minds...."


And four years later:

 "Shakespeare wished to impress upon us the truth: that action is the chief end of existence—that no faculties of intellect, however brilliant, can be considered valuable, or indeed
otherwise than as misfortunes, if they withdraw us from, or render us repugnant to action...."


Though Coleridge’s argument is philosophically jejune, the dissociation of thought and action that he brought to our attention (so successfully as to make it a hallmark of the play) reminds us of the larger question that the Western philosophical tradition has never managed to settle: how to persuade or coerce the Passions into accepting the sovereignty of Reason. Despite the incessantly repeated lessons of experience, and the teachings of David Hume, most of us take
it for granted that reason is not merely instrumental but normative: Reason ought to control the passions and in all right-thinking people it normally does. 

Hume showed us that reason is, ought, and could only be the slave of the passions. Since Hamlet’s behavior, considered in the abstract, apart from the poetry of the play, seems obviously irrational to right-thinking people, he must be either mad indeed, or borderline: what begins as an act turns into the real thing. The trouble with this rationalistic view of the play is that, first, it puts one squarely in Polonius’s camp; and, secondly it cannot be
sustained by a detailed analysis of what Hamlet actually says. Hamlet’s wit is always sound, always makes sense; though frequently odd, wayward, even perverse, it is consistent with what an original mind and personality might actually say.

Though Hamlet’s difficulties are certainly unique, they are not different in kind from those of any morally autonomous life: any life, that is to say, lived and more or less consciously understood, in Michael Oakeshott’s terms, as “an adventure in personal self-enactment.”
Religion, for such adventurers, becomes a matter of choice, human imperfections are taken
for granted, and the great thing is to know how to belong to oneself and to live by that understanding. Any such life is certain to find itself caught up in innummerable obscure, muddled and often squalid skirmishes over the rights of others, obligations to self, the truth of
statements, the lies large and small that people accept without question: dilemmas that can be rationally understood but not resolved. We are largely on our own in these matters, with nothing but our wit, intelligence, or conscience to see us through. Our conduct in these
squabbles and negotiations, in which ignorance is inevitable, unforgivable mistakes are easily made, defeat is common and victory rare, shows what we are made of. If one is not a fool and can learn to distinguish an honest person from a crook, honor from dishonor, good
faith from bad, one may begin to earn the trust of others. Otherwise, neither religion nor philosophy is likely to be of much use. Authenticity is not given but earned, forged in the struggle of the autonomous self for moral integrity. “Corrosive inwardness” is not a
bad description of how such a self, so engaged, is likely to be perceived.

To the extent that an autonomous moral consciousness responds with irony or skepticism to the clichés and platitudes of conventional morality—as, on occasion, it must—such a consciousness is likely to be perceived as corrosive or destructive.

Neither side, neither the morally autonomous adventurers nor the respectable and conventional stay-at-homes, is necessarily right or wrong about the creative/ destructive effects of moral autonomy. They represent different moral interests and Shakespeare has managed to represent their opposing claims in this play. That, in part, is what has made it so controversial, thorny and elusive.

“In art,” remarks Oscar Wilde, “there is no such thing as a universal truth. A truth in art is that whose contradictory is also true.” People and their societies are like works of art in this respect: a truth about a person or a society is often the sort of thing of which the contradictory
is also true. There is, after all, something to be said for the (supposedly) inauthentic social world which includes, along with the time-servers, opportunists, crooks, con-men and hypocrites, the masses of ordinary folk who live their lives as best they can, mind their own
business, take their morality as they find it, and don’t ask too many questions: people like the gravediggers with whom Hamlet chats as if he had all the time in the world, who are as authentic as the graves which it is their job to dig. The effect of this wonderful scene (IV.3),
insufficiently remarked, is to release us momentarily from the corrupt, constricted, world of the court at Elsinore—as Hamlet has already been released, into a world of action and adventure on the high seas—and remind us that there is a world of ordinary people in Denmark with whom Hamlet can converse on terms of easy familiarity, where jokes about death, the great leveller, can be exchanged freely and easily without having to be aimed at anyone
in particular. 

But time has run out for Hamlet, the King and Queen, the court, and Denmark: Denmark’s dysfunctional royal family has managed to set in motion the forces that are about to destroy it
as well as the fragile independence of Denmark. It is the best and the brightest member of this family, the only son, who should have been its hope for the future, whose political paralysis actually causes the final catastrophe. The alienated and disenchanted view of Hamlet is by
no means groundless, therefore, but grounded in an important, though partial, truth about him and the play: that his wit is, in some sense, “diseased,” (or dis-eased), that he himself is the unwitting carrier of the fever that “rages” in the blood of Denmark’s body politic, as in the
blood of Claudius (“like the hectic in my blood he rages.” IV.3.69) If we had to give this disease a name, we might call it the dis-ease of authenticity: the intense discomfort of a normally hypocritical society when it discovers that a morally autonomous and uniquely selfaware
individual of unusual intellectual and imaginative power has arrived and taken up residence.

From his first appearance, it is clear that Hamlet is an irritant simply by virtue of what he is: an honest man who lives by his own principles even (or especially?) if he thereby undermines the entire, recently constructed facade of order and authority. By insisting on the authenticity of his own behavior when we are meeting him for the first time (I.1), Hamlet dramatizes the inauthenticity of the King and Queen. That, under the circumstances, is a political act—or would be if Hamlet were thinking politically. Unfortunately for him and for Denmark, that is what he is unable or unwilling to do: “dodge and palter in the shifts of lowness,” as Antony says one must if one is politically weak. Hamlet resembles Brutus in this one respect at least: both
men are too virtuous to play the political game as it has to be played, unscrupulously and, if necessary, ignominiously.

The word “virtuous” shows us where the boundary is that divides the moral worlds inhabited by these two men, Brutus and Hamlet: the one, Brutus, self-consciously philosophical in a well-established (Stoic) philosophical tradition, who knows what the virtues are and how they
hang together (to have one you have to have them all, according to Aristotle); and the other, Hamlet, the uneasily self-conscious possessor of a virtue, authenticity, that hadn’t yet been named and that none of the philosophers in Brutus’s pantheon had ever heard of.

Hamlet is not a mindless fanatic like Gregers Werle in Ibsen’s Wild Duck who tries to force his own ideas of authenticity and moral autonomy onto a family that is quite happy within its protective fictions and illusions and wholly unprepared emotionally and intellectually to
respond to his demands. Unlike Ibsen’s antihero, Hamlet is not trying to be a moral hero. He does not see himself as a man whose mission in life it is to shake up the corrupt world of which he knows himself to be a part (“The time is out of joint. O cursed spite that ever I was born
to set it right.”) Yet Hamlet is a troublemaker simply by being true to himself. The only person he is trying to change is his mother, and in this he is being true to his deepest moral feelings. By placing this private act of moral redemption ahead of his public or political responsibilities,
however, he ruins everything.

Denmark is a perfectly commonplace and thoroughly secular state, full of ordinary people who just want to be left alone. A particularly heinous murder has just been committed, and the killer--as everyone knows--is happily seated on the throne, having married his victim’s widow. As Shakespeare knew and the history plays demonstrate, every regime is bloodstained. If Denmark is rotten, it is rotten in the way all human societies are rotten: because political power can never withstand rigorous moral scrutiny; because no political leader can afford the luxury of telling the people the whole truth and nothing but the truth when what
they prefer is fiction (if you do, there is a pretty good chance it will be used against you by your enemies); because words and deeds never match up in the real political world and the art of political rhetoric is to conceal this fact; because people accept the lies or half-truths their
leaders tell them when it is in their interest to do so.

Claudius is a pretty good king even if he is not a good man. It may even be the case (the Machiavellian case) that he is a pretty good king because he is not a good man. It is obvious that Claudius knows his business. Like Bolingbroke, he is not a soldier but a “politician”, a
man of “policy” (hateful words to men of honor like Hotspur). His foreign policy is shown to be effective; he is good at analyzing information; he sees things as they are, not as he would have them be; he is cool in emergencies and he knows men, their weaknesses and
hypocrisies. He knows exactly how to turn Laertes’ passion to his own advantage. The efforts of Hamlet Senior and his son, by contrast, merely serve to destroy the sovereignty of Denmark. By the end of the play, Fortinbras has the country firmly under Norwegian control.

It is entirely possible that this fictional Denmark would have been better served had Hamlet never been born—or the dead king, his father, not told his tale. The truth will not necessarily make you free. Ignorance, as the Danes discover to their cost, may not be exactly
blissful, but there are times, and this play shows us one of them, when it is preferable to knowledge.

Why does it seem right, then, that Hamlet should get a hero’s theatrical send-off at the end of the play? Because he, like Shakespeare and other great artists, has created the terms and standards by which he is to be judged. We readily forget or forgive the mess he makes of
Denmark because he has made himself into a new kind of hero, a man who does not seem but is, who can’t be bought and always tells the truth even if, like Emily Dickenson, he has to “tell it slant.” In a world where bad faith reigns, it’s either that or silence. Hamlet is the hero of
a standoff that has become a more and more familiar feature of our cultural landscape: the alienation of the individual sensibility and consciousness from a smug, morally inert, inauthentic world. Yet he would have been the last person to see himself as heroic. All he wants, at the end, is that his story should be told aright, not that he should become canonized or mythologized, put on a pedestal, a prop in Fortinbras’ political road show. The “stage”
that Hamlet’s body is displayed on at the end gives this paradoxical play about an unheroic hero, the heroic conclusion that he himself had never sought.

Hamlet: The Madness & The Critics

I
The Making of a Critical Tradition

Why does Hamlet delay? Why does he go mad? Or, if he doesn’t go mad, when, why, how does he feign madness? Does he feign madness? These are the famous questions that everyone knows about, even those who have never seen the play or read it. They were asked, for the first time, by the critics of the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries.

For a long time—from 1600 to 1736, to be exact—no one asked these questions; not in print, at any rate. Hamlet was referred to often during that time, but no one seems to have thought him weak or irresolute, or found anything odd, strange or problematical about the play.
In 1710 a nobleman and philosopher, the Earl of Shaftsbury, gave Shakespeare and especially this play his stamp of approval. He had reservations about Shakespeare’s “natural rudeness” of style, “his want of method and coherence,” but these were his only reservations and were of little consequence compared to the “justness of [Shakespeare’s] moral, the aptness of many of his descriptions, and the plain and natural turn of several of his characters.” Shakespeare pleases, he said, by his moral substance not his style, and he singled out Hamlet in particular for its direct, uncomplicated thought and morality: “That piece of his, the tragedy of HAMLET, which appears to have most affected English hearts, and has perhaps been oftenest acted of any which have come upon our stage, is almost one continu’d Moral; a series of deep reflections, drawn from one mouth, upon the subject of one single . . . calamity, naturally fitted to move horror and compassion.”

No one in 1710 or earlier, so far as we know, would have disagreed with these sentiments. Nor, it seems, had anyone tried to be specific about the play’s “one continu’d Moral,” or connected that moral with Hamlet’s reflections. No one had tried to think through the logic of the play or its plot. That changed twenty-six years later, in 1736, with the publication of an anonymous pamphlet (attributed to Sir Thomas Hanmer), Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet. For the first time, praise of the play was qualified by objections. There’s something here that doesn’t quite make sense. Having gotten himself into one absurdity, says Hanmer, Shakespeare is forced to have recourse to another. Since there is no reason why Hamlet should have to delay his revenge, Shakespeare has him fill up the time by pretending to be mad. This is a lame device, for it attracts attention instead of diverting it.

"To conform to the groundwork of his plot, Shakespeare makes the young Prince feign himself mad. I cannot but think this to be injudicious; for, so far from securing himself from any violence which he feared from the usurper, which was his design in so doing, it seems to have been the most likely way of getting himself confined and consequently debarred from an opportunity of revenging his father's death. To speak truly, our poet, by keeping too close to the groundwork of his plot, has fallen into an absurdity; there appears no reason at all in nature why this young Prince did not put the usurper to death as soon as possible, especially as Hamlet is represented as a youth so brave and so careless of his life. The case, indeed, is this: had Hamlet gone naturally to work, there would have been an end of our play. The poet, therefore, was obliged to delay his hero’s revenge; but then he should have contrived some good reason for it."

“A youth so brave and so careless of his life.” An uncomplicated young man. That was how Hamlet had been played by Betterton for almost fifty years (from 1661 to 1709) and by Garrick for thirty-four (1742 to 1776): strong-willed, active and energetic in pursuit of revenge with hardly a hint of weakness or passivity. Behind that uncomplicated view of Hamlet was a complicating fact. Both Betterton and Garrick simplified Hamlet and the play by cutting, in performance, lines that suggested vacillation or irresolution.

No one objected to their emendations, not even Johnson, until Richard Sheridan, as Boswell reports in his journal for April 6, 1763, “in his usual way railed against Mr. Garrick” and especially Garrick’s interpretation of the play.

"He gave us... a most ingenious dissertation on the character of Hamlet... He made it clear to us that Hamlet, notwithstanding his seeming incongruities, is a perfectly consistent character. Shakespeare drew him as the portrait of a young man of a good heart and fine feelings who has led a studious contemplative life and so become delicate and irresolute. He shows him in very unfortunate circumstances, the author of which he knows he ought to punish, but wants strength of mind to execute what he thinks is right and wishes to do. In this dilemma he makes Hamlet feign himself mad, as in that way he might put his uncle to death with less fear of the consequences of such an attempt. We therefore see Hamlet sometimes like a man really mad and sometimes like a man reasonable enough, though much hurt in mind. His timidity being once admitted, all the strange fluctuations which we perceive in him may be easily traced to that source."

Sheridan’s analysis of Hamlet’s character sounds familiar; people and critics are still talking this way about Hamlet. Sheridan, however, was somewhat ahead of his time. When Samuel Johnson turned his attention to the play, in 1765, he (like Hamner) found fault with the play not its hero.
Hamlet, wrote Johnson, in the notes to his edition of The Plays of William Shakespeare (1765), is clearly a wonderful and wonderfully entertaining play, but its “conduct is perhaps not wholly secure against objections. The action is indeed for the most part in continual progression, but there are some scenes which neither forward nor retard it.” And, while “the pretended madness of Hamlet causes much mirth,” there seems to be no good reason for it, “for he does nothing which he might not have done with the reputation of sanity. He plays the madman most when he treats Ophelia with so much rudeness, which seems to be useless and wanton cruelty.” And Johnson had other objections:

"Hamlet is, through the whole piece, rather an instrument than an agent. After he has, by the strategem of the play, convicted the King, he makes no attempt to punish him; and his death is at last effected by an incident which Hamlet had no part in producing. The catastrophe is not very happily produced; the exchange of weapons is rather an expedient of necessity than a stroke of art. A scheme might easily be formed to kill Hamlet with the dagger and Laertes with the bowl. The poet is accused of having shown little regard to poetical justice, and may be charged with equal neglect of poetical probability. The apparition left the regions of the dead to little purpose; the revenge which he demands is not obtained but by the death of him that was required to take it; and the gratification which would arise from the destruction of an usurper and a murderer is abated by the untimely death of Ophelia, the young, the beautiful, the harmless, and the pious."



None of the critics who came after Johnson wanted to follow his lead and find fault with Shakespeare. The defects that Johnson had noted, they said (in effect) are not in the play but in the hero. In 1778, two years after Garrick retired, George Steevens announced that Hamlet must be really insane. Nothing else, he said, can account for what is “unnatural and indefensible” in his conduct:

"The late Dr. Akinside once observed to me, that the conduct of Hamlet was every way unnatural and indefensible, unless he were to be regarded as a young man whose intellects were in some degree impaired by his own misfortunes: by the death of his father, the loss of expected sovereignty, and a sense of shame resulting from the hasty and incestuous marriage of his mother. I have dwelt the longer on this subject because Hamlet seems to have been hitherto regarded as a hero not undeserving the pity of the audience; and because no writer on Shakepeare has taken the pains to point out the immoral tendency of his character."

Dr. Akinside seems not to have brought anyone but Steevens around to his way of thinking. If Hamlet is really mad, what’s the point of the play? And how should we account for the fact that he has always been “regarded as a hero not undeserving the pity of the audience”? A madman might deserve our pity, but it is hard to see how he could have become the hero of the hugely popular tragedy that Shaftsbury was referring to, “which appears to have most affected English hearts and has perhaps been oftenest acted of any which have come upon our stage.”

But if Hamlet is not mad, how else shall we account for the “immoral tendency of his character”? That is the question, it seems to me, that was beginning to agitate the critics. And since those immoral tendencies were part and parcel of Hamlet’s wit, which the audiences always find hugely entertaining, the question became especially urgent.

Though the play would continue to captivate popular audiences, some of the critics were shaking their heads. Not liking the Hamlet that Shakespeare had given them, they invented a new one. What were they looking for? Not wit but feeling and—that new word or thing—sensibility. Hamlet, they said, is a man of such exquisite sensibility, pure motives and high ideals that he has to fail. People like him are too noble for this ugly world. Forced to clean it up, his mind gives way. Instead of celebrating his wayward wit, they turned him into a victim of the world and its ways: a hero-victim who falls upon the thorns of life, and bleeds. And if you had been in his position, you might also have acted in ways that would strike others as mad. (When Coleridge tried to imagine what it might be like to be Hamlet, he found the man that, to his sorrow, he thought he had become: “a man living in meditation, called upon to act by every motive human and divine, but the great object of his life defeated by continually resolving to do, yet doing nothing but resolve."

Let us examine this process of romantic identification in more detail. “We feel,” wrote Henry Mackenzie in 1780, not only the virtues, but the weaknesses, of Hamlet as our own; we see a man, who in other circumstances would have exercised all the moral and social virtues, placed in a situation in which even the amiable qualities of his mind serve but to aggravate his distress and to perplex his conduct. Our compassion for the first, and our anxiety for the latter, are excited in the strongest manner; and hence arises that indescribable charm in Hamlet which attracts every reader and every spectator, which the more perfect characters of other tragedies never dispose us to feel....When Horatio exclaims, on the death of his friend, ‘Now cracks a noble heart’ we forget the murder of the King, the villainy of Claudius, the guilt of Gertrude; our recollection dwells only on the memory of that ‘sweet prince,’ the delicacy of whose feelings a milder planet should have ruled, whose gentle virtues should have bloomed through a life of felicity and usefulness.



William Richardson, having found “the principle and spring of all his actions” in the “turpitude” of his mother, commented in 1784:

To erase an established affection, and substitute aversion, or even indifference, does violence to our nature; our affliction will bear an exact proportion to our former tenderness. So delicate is your affection, and so refined your sense of moral excellence, when the moral faculty is softened into a tender attachment, that the sanctity and purity of the heart you love must appear without a stain. Such is the condition of Hamlet. Exquisitely sensible of moral beauty and deformity, he discerns turpitude in a parent. Surprise adds bitterness to his sorrow . . .



In 1795, Goethe endorsed the view of Hamlet that Mackenzie and Richardson had been developing: a man of lofty and fragile sensibility, pure motives and high ideals thrust into the real world. Here is how his fictional theater-buff, Wilhelm Meister, invites us to imagine Hamlet (in Wilhelm Meister, Bk. V):

Tender and nobly descended, this royal flower grew up... Figure to yourselves this youth, this son of princes, conceive him vividly, bring his condition before your eyes, and then observe him when he learns that his father's spirit walks... A horrid shudder seizes him.... And when the Ghost has vanished, whom is it we see standing before us? A hero panting for vengeance?... No! Amazement and sorrow overwhelm the solitary young man... The time is out of joint: “O cursed spite, That ever I was born to set it right!” In these words, I imagine is the key to Hamlet’s whole procedure, and to me it is clear that Shakespeare sought to depict a great deed laid upon a soul unequal to the performance of it...



Mackenzie, Richardson and Goethe each invite us to put ourselves in Hamlet's position, to wear his shoes, on the assumption that what seems strange or odd in him will then seem only natural. There’s nothing strange or mysterious about him; at bottom he’s just like us. Hazlitt says as much: “It is we who are Hamlet.” But we aren’t, not at all. That’s why he’s interesting, because he is not like us. If we are like him, in some sense, the likeness is remote. Trying to naturalize Hamlet, these critics domesticated him. Coleridge, trying in 1808 to ground him and his ways in the immutable laws of human nature, pushed this process about as far as it can go.

“In order to understand Hamlet, it is essential that we should reflect on the constitution of our own minds. Man is distinguished from the brute animals in proportion as thought prevails over sense; but in the healthy processes of the mind, a balance is constantly maintained between the impressions from outward objects and the inward operations of the intellect; for if there be an overbalance in the contemplative faculty, man thereby becomes the creature of mere meditation, and loses his natural power of action. Now, one of Shakespeare's modes of creating characters is to conceive any one intellectual or moral faculty in morbid excess, and then to place himself, Shakespeare, thus mutilated or diseased, under the given circumstances. In Hamlet he seems to have wished to exemplify the moral necessity of a due balance between our attention to the objects of our senses and our meditation on the working of our minds—an equilibrium between the real and imaginary worlds. In Hamlet this
balance is disturbed... "



Coleridge assumes, here, that minds are everywhere and at all times the same. It is a neo-classical assumption, but the moralistic tone is all his own. The concept of mental health that Coleridge is invoking is conventional, as is his concept of ‘reason’. Reasonable people, he implies, don’t permit themselves to become so caught up in their private meditations and fantasies as to lose the power of action in the public world.

It is odd to be lectured at in this way, on the moral necessity of finding a proper “equilibrium between the real and the imaginary worlds,” by the man who had written, in 1798, that quintessential romantic poem, Kubla Khan, a poem that does as much as a poem can to remove or straddle the boundary between real and imagined worlds.

In 1864, Thomas Kenny noticed, briefly, that our uncertainties and doubts about Hamlet are caused by the “devious” and “disordered” energies of the play itself. His oddities are not part of his character but built into the play.

Hamlet is, perhaps, of all the plays of Shakespeare the one which a great actor would find most difficult to embody in an ideally complete form. It would, we think, be a mistake to attempt to elaborate its multiform details into any distinctly harmonious whole. Its whole action is devious, violent, spasmodic. Its distempered, inconstant irritability is its very essence. Its only order is the manifestation of a wholly disordered energy.



That disordered energy frightened or repelled Coleridge and he tried to impose an order of his own on it. What is strange in Hamlet is, he would have us believe, merely the natural effect of “an overbalance of the imaginative power, beautifully illustrated in the everlasting broodings and superflous activities of Hamlet's mind...” Hamlet is a problem to be explained, not celebrated. And this way of explaining him is necessarily reductive, as all good explanations are. It is not the power of Hamlet’s imagination, or wit, that interests Coleridge but the way it beautifully illustrates the truth of a psychological theory which finds his wit “superfluous.”

The unromantic method of trying to make Hamlet conform to contemporary conventions of reason and morality led Coleridge, in his lecture of 1812, to say something uncharacteristically simple-minded:

"Shakespeare wished to impress upon us the truth: that action is the chief end of existence—that no faculties of intellect, however brilliant, can be considered valuable, or indeed otherwise than as misfortunes, if they if they withdraw us from, or render us repugnant to action..."



And so that which is strange, wild, wayward and original—the qualities that have made people think Hamlet might actually be slightly mad—drops out of Coleridge's reading of the play.
Kenny's insight did not attract attention, then or later—not even his own. It was offered merely in passing, toward the close of the chapter on Hamlet in his sensible but otherwise unremarkable book, The Life and Genius of Shakespeare, and he made no further use of it.

When A. C. Bradley wrote his hugely influential Shakespearean Tragedy (1904), he took it for granted that the problems of the play are grounded in the character of its hero. He thereby perpetuated the bad nineteenth-century habit of confusing Hamlet and the play. C. S. Lewis's 1942 lecture, “Hamlet: The Prince or The Poem?” was an attempt to correct that habit. In order to see the play whole, he had to rescue it from the critics who had been confusing it with the Prince. But old habits die hard.

Why does this one habit die so hard? Because it is easier to talk about Hamlet’s character than to talk about the play? That’s part of it, but I think there is a more interesting answer. C. S. Lewis put a finger on it when he said that the play does not contain enough information “for any portrait of the kind critics have tried to draw.” Hamlet's procrastination can’t be explained because it is a given; not a problem put there for us to solve but a premise that the play is built on. But instead of discouraging speculation, the absence of information has become a hole that criticism has tried to fill.

Shakespeare also put something in the play that has encouraged criticism to focus on the Prince, and he did it for a reason—though not for that reason. I am talking about the “antic disposition” that Hamlet warns his friends, and the audience, that he may from time to time “put on.”

Johnson took it for granted that Hamlet's madness is not real but feigned. That had evidently been the traditional view. It broke down when medical science began, in the late eighteenth-century to think seriously about madness as a disease of the mind. Dr. Akinside's diagnosis of clinical insanity coincides exactly with the critical turn from the idea of a defective play to a defective hero. Then, for roughly a hundred years, the question was seriously debated: is Hamlet really mad or is he just pretending? Beginning with Bradley, that particular question was dropped. Bradley prefers “melancholy” to “mad” and notes, without much interest, that an “antic disposition” is occasionally put on. Twentieth-century criticism tended to go in one direction or the other: some assume, like Steevens, that Hamlet's disordered energy is pathological, others that he’s putting it on. While neither of these assumptions can withstand scrutiny, the latter at least is in the text of the play—all of them, beginning with the First Quarto.
Why is it in the text? If the “antic disposition” speech does no work in the play, why is it there? To answer this question, we must go back to Shakespeare's sources and think about how he might have used them.

II
The Sources

Madness had, from the beginning, been an important part of the Hamlet story. Shakespeare’s play came by it naturally, so to speak. How this happened is not well understood. Here is what we know about the story, especially the madness motif, before Shakespeare undertook the task of writing his own version.

In both Saxo’s twelfth-century Historiae Danicae and in Belleforest's sixteenth-century recension, Histoires Tragiques, the hero, Amleth, is a boy when his father is murdered by his brother, the boy’s uncle. Since the murder and identity of the murderer are common knowledge, there is no need of a ghost to inform Amleth about it and incite him to revenge. He pretends to be mad—an imbecile, actually—so that his uncle will think he is harmless and let him live. That is, under the circumstances, a reasonable thing for him to do. When, eventually, he becomes a man he springs his long planned and carefully laid trap and avenges the murder of his father.

Someone it seems adapted the Hamlet story for the stage in the late 1580s. This “Ur-Hamlet” (as it is usually referred to) was very popular which, no doubt, is why Shakespeare’s company decided to refurbish it. Shakespeare's play was so wildly successful, in turn, that it completely eclipsed the older play. We know nothing more about that play but what can be gleaned from a few disdainful references. We know from one of them that it had a ghost, who “cried miserably for revenge,” and that therefore Kyd (or whoever it was) must have radically changed the older story. Since the ghost cries for revenge, the hero would probably not have been a boy but a man who is capable of carrying it off. While the fact that he learns about his father’s murder from his father’s ghost means that the murder is not public knowledge but a secret known only to the ghost, the murderer and now the son. The son, therefore, has no reason to feign madness, and every reason to act as if nothing has happened—to look, as Lady Macbeth tells her husband, like the innocent flower but be the serpent under it. It is almost certain that this earlier Hamlet does feign madness, nevertheless. Kyd (if the play was by Kyd) uses the device in his (other?) revenge play, The Spanish Tragedy and so does Shakespeare himself in Titus Andronicus. Shakespeare's first audiences may have been expecting something similar. When Shakespeare has Hamlet warn his friends of strange antics to come, he could have been playing to that expectation.

It is not clear that he does much to satisfy it. Hamlet is sufficiently strange and odd, to be sure, and he tells us so (he is as much a puzzle to himself as to us) but if one comes to this play expecting antics, clowning, deliberate foolery, you are likely to be left wondering—unless the actor who is playing this part deliberately cues the audience through some bit of stage business that that is what he is doing. Johnson's remark suggests that that may have been how the part was traditionally played in his time: “the pretended madness of Hamlet causes much mirth...” That tradition seems to have lasted well into the nineteenth century. William Maginn doubts, in 1836, that the “common spectator” could abide the play “without having Polonius buffooned for him, and, to no small extent, Hamlet himself; as he always was whenever I saw the part played, and as the great critic, Dr. Johnson, would seem to think he ought to be. For he says, ‘the pretended madness of Hamlet causes much mirth!!!’”

Why did Johnson take it for granted that Hamlet is feigning? It is an important question. The text of the play is genuinely ambiguous, and this is not something that 20th century criticism has invented. Though Hamlet tells us to watch out for the “antic disposition” that he just might “put on”, there are no cues to show that here he is pretending to be mad and here he is just being his normal self—whatever that is; nothing to show that he ever puts on the appearance of madness or even that lesser thing, an antic disposition, or that he doesn’t. Shakespeare left this matter to the discretion of the player or the director, and Garrick it seems never questioned the theatrical tradition. So the question, above, has to be rephrased: not, why did Johnson take it for granted that Hamlet’s madness is feigned, but why didn’t he question Garrick's assumption that it is?

Well, in a way, he did question it, except that he directed his criticism at the play, not its interpretation. He did not say that Hamlet is unclear or ambiguous on the question of madness, feigned or otherwise, but that feigned madness does not make sense: “Of the feigned madness of Hamlet there appears no adequate cause, for he does nothing which he might not have done with the reputation of sanity.” This, he implies, is a fault in the play.

Johnson was right and I think Shakespeare would have agreed with him. He too must have noticed that the pretence of madness no longer serves any useful purpose, either in the “Ur-Hamlet” or his own: a wheel spinning idly, rubber that doesn’t meet the road. So why did Shakespeare bother to raise the question at all?

Shakespeare left the question of madness—real, feigned or neither—hinted at but unresolved for both obvious and not-so-obvious reasons. Perhaps he did not want to ruin a good thing. The pretended madness of Hamlet had already been shown, in the earlier play, to be the cause of much mirth. It was good theater and good theater was his business. That’s the obvious reason. It is not, perhaps, the most important one. To get at the one that matters, you have to ask yourself some such question as the following: what would it mean for the play as a whole if Shakespeare had cued the text to indicate when Hamlet is pretending to be mad and when he is not? It would, for one thing, have made the play much more crudely theatrical, since each of these cues would be taken by the actors as an invitation to show off his technical brilliance. So the play would consist of a series of arias and every time it was put on, the actor playing the part would try to outdo his predecessor in buffoonery. And there would have been a subtler effect: the existence of such cues would mean that Shakespeare himself had taken a position on some necessary questions of the play, questions which the play leaves open: what is madness, what is sanity?

Frank Kermode, in his introduction to Hamlet in the Riverside edition, calls the play “extremely theatrical” because it is so continously self-referential; it is full of references to playing and acting. But that’s meta-theatricality. Theatricality is different and, like realism, is relative: more or less theatrical than what? The relevant comparison, as William Empson showed us in 1953, is with the “Ur-Hamlet” (which he assumed to be Kyd’s) which was almost certainly more naively theatrical than Shakespeare’s, not less. Kyd’s theatricality, wrote Empson, had gone out of fashion by 1600 and it was Shakespeare’s job to bring the old play up to date and replace it. Here is what Empson had to say about the way Shakespeare might have approached this task:

The current objection to the old play Hamlet, which must have seemed very hard to surmount, can be glimpsed in the surviving references to it. It was thought absurdly theatrical. Even in 1589 the phrase “whole Hamlets, I should say handfuls, of tragical speeches” treats Hamlet as incessantly wordy, and the phrase of 1596, “as pale as the vizard of the ghost which cried so miserably at the Theater, like an oyster wife, Hamlet Revenge”, gets its joke from the idea that her dismal bawling may start again at any moment... The objection is not against melodrama, which they liked well enough, but against delay. You had a hero howling out “Revenge” all through the play, and everybody knew the revenge wouldn’t come till the end.



Shakespeare solved this problem by making the audience forget, from moment to moment, that it is in a theater, and he accomplished this feat of dramatic illusion, as Empson goes on to show, by making the play self-referential: he made the play less theatrical, more natural, by—paradoxically—introducing the various meta-theatrical devices that Kermode mentions. Empson, curiously, calls it a “purely technical decision.” He thought: “The only way to shut this hole [delay] is to make it big. I shall make Hamlet walk up to the audience and tell them, again and again, ‘I don't know why I'm delaying any more than you do; the motivation of this play is just as blank to me as it is to you; but I can't help it.’ What is more, I shall make it impossible for them to blame him. And then they daren’t laugh." It turned out, of course, that this method, instead of reducing the old play to farce, made it thrillingly life-like and profound... Looked at in this way, the plot at once gave questions of very wide interest... Whole areas of the old play suddenly became so significant that one could wonder whether Kyd had meant that or not; whether Hamlet really wants to kill Claudius, whether he was ever really in love with Ophelia, whether he can continue to grasp his own motives while “acting a part” before the Court, whether he is not really more of an actor than the Players, whether he is not (properly speaking) the only sincere person in view.... Surely this is what critics have long found so interesting..."



Goethe had also noticed (in Wilhelm Meister) that this play gives the illusion of not being a play at all:

It pleases, it flatters us greatly to see a hero who acts of himself, who loves and hates as his heart prompts, undertaking and executing, thrusting aside all hindrances, and accomplishing his great purpose. Historians and poets would fain persuade us that so proud a lot may fall to man. In Hamlet we are taught otherwise: the hero has no plan, but the piece is full of plan. Here is no villain upon whom vengeance is inflicted according to a certain scheme, rigidly and in a peculiar manner carried out.... Here in this play of ours, how strange! Purgatory sends its spirit and demands revenge; but in vain! All circumstances combine and hurry to revenge; in vain! Neither earthly nor infernal thing may bring about what is reserved for Fate alone. The hour of judgement comes. The bad falls with the good. One race is mowed away, another springs up.

If Goethe and Empson are right about Shakespeare’s intention in Hamlet, to write a play that gives the illusion of not being a play, that has consequences for the way we read it. Feigned madness is out because feigning is inherently theatrical; it has to be enacted in ways that will be obvious to the audience. So I think we have to take Hamlet seriously when he disclaims ‘seeming’ in his first scene: “Seems, madam? Nay, it is. I know not ‘seems.’” This is a play about a man who cannot understand why he does not or cannot act and the play keeps reminding us that acting and seeming go together: to act politically is to play a part out in the public world. (The association of politics and theater was a commonplace in the 1590s and for a good reason: no court has ever been more brilliantly theatrical than Queen Elizabeth’s.)

A person who does not act, who is what she seems, is sincere. Sincerity is an untheatrical virtue. It is Hamlet’s virtue.

Johnson thought that Shakespeare had shown, in Hamlet, little regard for either poetical justice or poetical probability. He cannot have been the first person to notice that, on the whole, the play is strangely indifferent to the moral expectations of its audience; just the first not only to say so but to judge such indifference objectionable. Previously, so far as we know, audiences had more or less happily acquiesced in the way Hamlet reflects the irrationality of life and the world.

Succeeding generations preferred to blame their discomfort on Hamlet. They were less interested in his wit than his pathology, and less interested in his strangeness than in trying to explain it. Deceived by Shakespeare’s innovative, anti-theatrical realism, they insisted on talking about Hamlet as if he were a real person, or a character in a novel which to them was almost the same thing. They passed their assumptions on to succeeding generations and these assumptions have infected attitudes toward this play ever since.

Sunday, May 3, 2009

James' Critique of Romantic Selfhood: PORTRAIT OF A LADY

One thing leads to another: thinking about Dickens' novel, Little Dorrit, I was reminded of some lines in Wordsworth's "Immortality Ode" ("Shades of the prison-house begin to close . . . ") which led me to further thoughts about the 19th century novel. And now I've been thinking about the tragic predicament or dilemma that the heroine of one these, Isabel Archer in Henry James' Potrait Of A Lady (1880) lands herself in.

What is a tragic dilemma? A situation in which you are damned if you do and damned if don't. Tragic dilemmas wouldn't occur in a reasonable world; every problem would have a rational solution. We don't live in a reasonable world: reason can and not infrequently does lead to contradictory judgements or impossible choices.

Isabel Archer is a young American woman with what would, in the 1870s or 80s have been typically American ideas or ideals about life, the world, and the self--typical, at any rate, for those brought up and educated within the magnetic field of Ralph Waldo Emerson. (See Richard Poirier's essay in The Comic Sense of Henry James). Thoreau, a student of Emerson's, gives us something of the flavor of those teachings when he is telling us, in Walden, why he went to live in the woods.

I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, to discover that I had not lived. I did not wish to live what was not life, living is so dear; nor did I wish to practise resignation, unless it was quite necessary. I wanted to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life, to live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to rout all that was not life, to cut a broad swath and shave close, to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its lowest terms, and, if it proved to be mean, why then to get the whole and genuine meanness of it, and publish its meanness to the world; or if it were sublime, to know it by experience, and be able to give a true account of it.

Why would one go live in the woods to find out what life had to teach? Why not New York, or London, or Paris? A hundred or so years earlier, Samuel Johnson had said, "He who is tired of London is tired of life." How does one learn what life is all about but by playing the hand one's been dealt and living the life one's got wherever that is?

Emerson, to be fair, did not tell Thoreau or anyone else to avoid cities and live in the woods. He did, however encourage people to take a heroic view of their own free 'self-development' (as we would say) as a goal in itself independently of the conventions, ready-made opinions and official emotions of organized, systematic society. Freedom, he implied, is incompatible with life in that world. James novel tests that (romantic) idea--and finds it, to my way of thinking at least, insufficient.

Isabel, to sum up crudely a subtle work of intricate art, tries to live deliberately and freely, independently of the great social machine that is trying to draw her in and make her part of it, but she is too inexperienced, too innocent; when she meets a man, Gilbert Osmond, who seems to be living deliberately, freely, independently, she has no way of knowing that this cosmopolitan American expat is merely a sterile, snobbish esthete who lives in Italy because he is too poor to live in unproductive idleness anywhere else, and wants her money; he gives the illusion of one who lives deliberately, freely, independently--and honestly--just because he is not part of the Italian social-political-economic structure any more than she is and information as to his character is not readily accessible--as it would have been had they met in, say, New York. Or maybe not. Isabel wants to believe in Osmond and refuses to listen to those who try to warn her.

She soon realizes her mistake but she is trapped. It was not so easy to get out of a bad marriage in those days. She thinks of leaving Osmond but all her choices are bad and she accepts her lot: death of the mind and heart as the wife of a man who makes Joseph de Maistre look like a liberal, in the "house of darkness, the house of dumbness, the house of suffocation."

That is not the way Jane Austen's novels end.